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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S HOMILETICS 
MARC SPINDELMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Viewed closely and comprehensively, Masterpiece Cakeshop, far from simply 
being the narrow, shallow, and modest decision many have taken it to be, is a rich, 
multi-faceted decision that cleaves and binds the parties to the case, carefully 
managing conflictual crisis. Through a ruling for a faithful custom-wedding-cake 
baker against a state whose legal processes are held to have been marred by anti-
religious bias, the Court unfolds a cross-cutting array of constitutional wins and losses 
for cultural conservatives and traditional moralists, on the one hand, and for lesbians 
and gay men and their supporters committed to civil and equal rights, on the other. 
The Court’s central anti-religious-discrimination holding doesn’t only potentially 
benefit opponents of such discrimination in other cases. This holding also has 
boomerang-like tendencies that should make it useful for those who would level anti-
discrimination claims on a variety of other grounds. Liberal and progressive audiences 
might thus reconsider their aversions to the decision for this reason alone. What’s 
more, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “shadow rulings,” described in detail here, dole out 
notable victories to cultural conservatives, traditional moralists, and lesbians and gay 
men alike. Officially declining to adjudicate the merits of the baker’s artistic freedom 
claim under the First Amendment, the Court’s opinion expresses openness and 
sympathy, but ultimately substantive doubt about it. In these respects, and 
notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, Masterpiece Cakeshop is full of 
substantive lawmaking. Having tracked that lawmaking to its textual limits, analysis 
turns to the opinion’s final passage, which, on one level, importantly recapitulates the 
opinion’s constitutional rulemaking, instructing courts and governmental actors one 
last time on how to handle cases like this one in the future. On another level, the 
passage is a compass pointing to lessons in moral politics that the opinion offers to the 
partisans of the Kulturkampf. One version of the Court’s moral-political teaching 
involves instruction in a moral politics of respect and friendship. This may be 
practically politically viable, leaving aside whether it will in fact be accepted. A more 
ambitious version of the opinion’s moral-political teaching involves a moral politics 
of sibling love that’s certain to be widely and emphatically rejected. Reconfigured in 
aesthetic terms, however, the moral politics of sibling love may receive a more 
nuanced hearing: widely dismissed as an undertaking appropriate for politics, but 
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received with perhaps different sensibilities on an aesthetic plane. If it’s presently 
uncertain and undecidable whether Masterpiece Cakeshop will prove to have been a 
major legal event, whatever is ultimately made of it, it covers plenty of ground, doing 
plenty of legal and extra-legal work, in the here and now. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is more to the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission than initially meets the eye.1 
Masterpiece Cakeshop isn’t simply a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling by the 
Court for a faithful custom-wedding-cake baker against a state whose legal processes 
were marred by anti-religious taint.2 The Court’s decision does entail that ruling, of 
 
1  138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
2  For some illustrations of thinking describing Masterpiece Cakeshop in these basic terms, 
see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2019 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 167, 167 n.2 (2019) [hereinafter, Laycock, Broader Implications of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop] (collecting sources describing the case along these lines, and noting the narrow 
readings courts have given Masterpiece Cakeshop); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious 
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 201, 
202 n.5 (2018) (noting sources) [hereinafter NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and 
Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop]; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court rules in 
favor of baker who would not make wedding cake for gay couple, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-baker-
who-would-not-make-wedding-cake-for-gay-couple/2018/06/04/50c68cf8-6802-11e8-bea7-
c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.c3e0d13c12df (talking about “Kennedy’s narrow 
ruling”); Amy Howe, Justices send cake sequel back to state court, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17, 
2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/justices-send-cake-sequel-back-to-state-court/ 
(describing Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “narrow ruling”); Adam Liptak, In Narrow Decision, 
Supreme Court Sides With Baker Who Turned Away Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2018, at 
A1 (remarking that “[t]he breadth of the court’s majority was a testament to the narrowness of 
the decision’s reasoning”); see also Chad Flanders & Sean Olivera, An Incomplete Masterpiece, 
66 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 154, 158 (2019) (characterizing Masterpiece Cakeshop not only as “a 
narrow decision,” the “goals” of which may have been “avoidance and minimalism,” but also 
as “an incomplete decision, even a badly incomplete one”); Mark Movesian, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 750 (2019) 
(concluding that “Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow decision,” and that “[t]he case turns on 
rather unique facts and does little to resolve conflicts between our anti-discrimination laws . . . 
and our commitment to religious freedom,” but then observing that the decision’s “narrowness” 
is “deceptive” and reflects broad “cultural and political trends” that may impact the shape of 
future doctrine). The analysis in these pages converges with and exceeds perspectives that have 
already challenged the received wisdom on Masterpiece Cakeshop. See, e.g., Laycock, Broader 
Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra, at 168 (venturing that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
isn’t narrow, because, “as written, combined with . . . savvy lawyering . . . , [it] logically leads 
to a general protection for conscientious objectors, at least in religiously important contexts 
such as weddings”); NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra, at 202 (arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop is not narrow, 
because it “supplied more guidance on the relationship between religious exemptions and 
antidiscrimination law [in cases of sexual orientation as well as race] than most have 
acknowledged”); Mark Strasser, Masterpiece of Misdirection, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 963, 
964 (2019) (describing Masterpiece Cakeshop as a “narrow opinion” while pointing to its 
“potential to . . . bring about significant changes in existing law” where “the bases for these 
important deviations are found not in the holding itself but in the factors that the Court implicitly 
endorses for consideration and in the implicit roles that these factors should play in future 
cases”). 
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course, but it also unfolds a more complex and cross-cutting array of constitutional 
wins and losses for cultural conservatives and traditional moralists, on the one hand, 
and for lesbians and gay men and their supporters, and for others committed to civil 
and equal rights, on the other.3  
This larger tally of Masterpiece Cakeshop includes dimensions of it that have been 
widely missed. Not only does the Court’s central anti-religious-discrimination holding 
pour a jurisgenerative foundation that may prove useful for opponents of 
discrimination on religious grounds, but that same ruling also has boomerang-like 
tendencies that make it useful for those who might wish to level other sorts of anti-
discrimination claims. There is also the matter of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “shadow 
rulings”—rulings that, to varying degrees, dole out notable victories to cultural 
conservatives, traditional moralists, and to lesbians and gay men and other members 
of other traditionally subordinated groups alike. Of the opinion’s textured treatment 
of the First Amendment claims to protections for artistic freedom ventured on the 
cakemaker’s behalf, the Court, officially declining to adjudicate their merits, 
nevertheless subtly does, striking a pose of openness, sympathy, but ultimately 
substantive doubt about them. Having surveyed these aspects of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, discussion focuses on the final passage of the Court’s opinion, which is a 
source of constitutional rulemaking and an important aspect of the larger moral-
political instruction that Masterpiece Cakeshop provides: teachings on and around 
moral politics of respect and friendship, and, more ambitiously, of sibling love, key 
aspects of the opinion’s homiletics. 
Viewed closely and comprehensively, Masterpiece Cakeshop, far from being 
simply a narrow, shallow, and modest decision, though not wholly lacking in those 
elements in some refined respects, is an opinion that complexly cleaves and binds the 
parties to the case. It carefully manages conflictual crisis while leaving uncertain and 
undecidable as of yet whether the case is or will become a major or minor legal event. 
As Justice Kennedy explained shortly after issuing his enigmatic decision for the 
Court in Romer v. Evans when pressed in an interview to reveal its meaning: “It will 
be interesting to see how [it] is understood[.]”4 Everything depends on what’s done 
with it. Whatever that is, with time, Masterpiece Cakeshop covers plenty of ground 
and does plenty of legal and extra-legal work in the here and now. 
I. READING THE MAJORITY OPINION 
This engagement with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
begins with the reasons for the broad agreement that quickly emerged and coalesced 
 
3  Saying this this way and so following standard imaginaries of the stakes of the case to some 
degree isn’t to forget that some LGBT people are cultural conservatives and traditional 
moralists. A different, but connected, way of thinking along these lines is supplied by Joseph 
William Singer, Public Accommodations & Human Flourishing: Sexual Orientation & 
Religious Liberty (An Essay in Honor of Greg Alexander), CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (“Baker Jack Phillips saw marriage as a religious matter 
and same-sex marriage as a sin, and if that is so, then he refused to design a wedding cake for 
Craig and Mullen because their religious beliefs differed from his own.” (footnote omitted)). 
4  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. 
11, 1996, at 82, 90 (quoting Justice Kennedy). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5
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around the decision in liberal and progressive circles, where it is already ordinarily 
portrayed as a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling.5 This representation is highly 
congenial to projects circulating among left-liberals and left-progressives that, owing 
to their various commitments, seek to minimize the reach of the victory that 
Masterpiece Cakeshop hands to anti-liberal and anti-progressive forces of cultural 
conservatism and traditional moralism. 
The tactical utility of this gloss is one thing, but as an account of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop as text it is something else. Certainly it is if one begins with the issue of 
authorship. Here, right now, in this case suddenly, an emerging convention effectively 
braves to say that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, at the very tail end of his career on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, has broken with the romantic, mysterious, agonized, and 
ultimately quite maximalist method that has for years been a signature of his 
jurisprudence and legacy, not least of all respecting the rights of lesbians and gay men 
in intimate relationships.6 
This is a possibility to be sure, but it is sensible to approach it with a degree of 
skepticism—skepticism warranted even acknowledging that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
itself purports to focus in a very common-law-like fashion on the particularities of the 
record and the legal proceedings in the case and even acknowledging that the 
common-law-like features of the Court’s opinion are designed to give it the 
appearance of being minor and slow-going, an incremental, one-case-at-a-time 
ruling.7 Nor is the skepticism about Masterpiece Cakeshop’s ostensible judicial 
minimalism overcome by the way Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, again on 
its surface, purports to leave the deep questions and clashes of values swirling in the 
case undecided.8 
These calibrated assertions by the Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop 
decision may—indeed, should—be doubted. As the argument developed in the 
 
5 See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Supreme Court Upholds Basic Principles of 
Nondiscrimination, Reverses Colorado Civil Rights Commission Decision (June 4, 2018) 
(available at https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/supreme-court-upholds-basic-principles-
nondiscrimination-reverses-colorado-civil) (“The court did not accept arguments that would 
have turned back the clock on equality by making our basic civil rights protections 
unenforceable, but reversed this case based on concerns specific to the facts here.”); Press 
Release, Lambda Legal, Supreme Court Fails to Affirm LGBT Equality Rights (June 4, 2018) 
(https://www.lambdalegal.org/news/us_20180604_masterpiece-cakeshop-decision) (“Today, 
the U.S. Supreme Court handed the religious right a limited, fact-specific victory . . . .”). The 
standard reading of the case as narrow, shallow, and modest holds even against the ways liberal 
and progressive readers also recognize some of the decision’s more far-reaching aspects. See, 
e.g., id. (“The Court today has offered dangerous encouragement to those who would deny civil 
rights to LGBT people and people living with HIV.”) (statement by Lambda Legal CEO Rachel 
B. Tiven). See also sources cited supra note 2. 
6  A number of criticisms leveled at Justice Kennedy and his jurisprudence are collected and 
responded to in Douglas M. Parker, Justice Kennedy: The Swing Voter & His Critics, 11 GREEN 
BAG 2d. 317 (2008). 
7 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (2001). 
8  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24, 1732 
(2018). 
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following pages maintains, Masterpiece Cakeshop textually addresses, and in 
important ways engages, the deep and broad clashes of values between equality-based 
civil rights, particularly for lesbians and gay men, and freedom of speech and of 
religion. Beyond any question of authorial intent, there is action, there is text: Justice 
Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion for the Court puts down markers on the 
very issues it says it’s leaving unresolved and does so in ways that, once 
comprehended, should be taken as legally authoritative in important, if variegated, 
respects.  
Sketching the larger thought while leaving details to be filled in: A minimalist 
gloss on Masterpiece Cakeshop has its tactical utilities, but in its robust forms above 
all, it cannot be sustained as a meaningful account of the text of the opinion the 
Supreme Court actually has brought down. Without venturing prediction, it is possible 
that, in time, Masterpiece Cakeshop will be recognized as a deeply generative source 
of law, much in the way that Romer v. Evans, which eventuated in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, now is.9 The ground that Masterpiece Cakeshop turns is certainly 
jurisprudentially fecund. How fecund and in exactly what ways remains to be seen. 
To summarize the argument pressed in this part: Closely read, the opinion’s fact-
minded holding in favor of Masterpiece Cakeshop and its owner, Mr. Jack Phillips, 
operationalizes ideas about governmental discrimination that are strikingly far-
reaching; moreover, those ideas far exceed the central holding of the case—that Jack 
Phillips and his cakeshop suffered unconstitutional discrimination based on religion 
at the state’s hands—and involve several supplemental or “shadow” rulings that 
Masterpiece Cakeshop also delivers.10 These shadow rulings practically engage and 
resolve significant aspects of the deep and “difficult questions” the opinion suggests 
it is bracketing in their entirety.11 The significance of the substantive constitutional—
and by extension, as will be seen, the political and moral—promises the Court makes 
as shadow law, importantly structured so as symmetrically to benefit both supporters 
of equality-based civil rights, including LGBT rights, and cultural conservatives and 
traditional moralists, elevates these rulings to a doctrinal status that, if not formally 
black letter law, is not very far from it, and that cannot be treated merely as dicta.12 
 
9  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
On Romer’s potential generativity, which proved prophetic, see generally Louis Michael 
Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 67 (1997). For a similar notion of this comparison of Masterpiece Cakeshop with 
Romer, see Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors, 2017 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 151 (2017–18) (invoking Seidman’s prediction and suggesting that 
Masterpiece Cakeshop may be “‘generative’ of broader holdings” for religious conservatives). 
10  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.  
11  Id. at 1723. 
12  According to reports, this symmetry was on display even as Masterpiece Cakeshop was 
being handed down. Here’s Mark Walsh’s description: “Kennedy keeps teetering from 
principles favoring one side or the other.” Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: Justice 
Kennedy’s Master-pièce de Résistance, SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/a-view-from-the-courtroom-justice-kennedys-master-
piece-de-resistance/. For a different reading of the case than the one offered here that also 
 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5
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This suggests the need in the future for some mapping of the forms of shadow law.13 
In any event, viewed together, all the rulings in Masterpiece Cakeshop cast the tactical 
description of it in liberal and progressive quarters as a narrow, shallow, and modest 
ruling as, at best, more politically useful than faithful to the complexities of the Court’s 
text. Masterpiece Cakeshop has ambitions that run wide and deep and that are not 
modest in any meaningful sense. Everyone either already knows this or should to a 
degree. What follows explores the substantive ground this knowledge treads. 
A. An Initial Look: Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Formal Holding 
Before the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
many in left-liberal and left-progressive circles were convinced that they knew and 
understood the relevant scene of constitutional discrimination the case involved. That 
scene, naturally, involved the refusal by Mr. Jack Phillips, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
owner, a baker and a man of deep faith, to prepare and bake a custom wedding 
celebration cake for Mr. Charlie Craig and Mr. David Mullins, a gay couple who 
wished to celebrate their love and their out-of-state wedding back in their home state 
of Colorado.14 And so it was that many left-progressives were surprised—shocked, 
alarmed, outraged, too—when Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, seemingly out of nowhere, rewriting the script, changing the subject, and 
making the case’s central holding turn on the record and proceedings below, 
announced that another scene of decision—the legal proceedings themselves—was 
constitutionally dispositive.15  
Famously, Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion trains its sights on 
the machinery of state in Colorado and how it processed Craig and Mullins’s 
complaint against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop, zeroing in on a few key 
moments during the hearings before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission which 
took place after a state Administrative Law Judge had issued a decision finding 
Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop had in fact and at law discriminated against Craig 
and Mullins when refusing to make them a bespoke wedding celebration cake.16  
Surveying this extended bureaucratic moment via a review of the paper record, the 
Court announces its conviction that a few moments of the proceedings and their 
 
recognizes the symmetries it involves at the level of its “tone and spirit,” but that emphasizes 
its “reasoning betrayed its own rhetorical posture” and could “undermine the very spirit of 
symmetric toleration that the opinion’s rhetoric aims to advance,” see Zachary Price, Symmetric 
Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 
70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1292 (2019). 
13  The concept of “shadow law” as used here doesn’t map onto ideas of secret law, say, in the 
way discussed in the government secrets literature, e.g., David Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 257 (2010), Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
J. 241 (2015), nor to customary law as found in the social norms theory literature, see, e.g., Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extra Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 115 (1992); Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom’s Shadows, 23 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 179 (2011).  
14  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24. 
15  See, e.g., id. 
16  Id.; id. at 1725–27. 
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aftermath tainted the entire legal processing of Craig and Mullins’s anti-discrimination 
claim against Phillips and his bakery.17 This, in short, is because the process, in the 
Court’s estimation, was “inconsistent with the State’s [constitutional] obligation of 
religious neutrality.”18  
Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion describes the Commission’s 
proceedings in sharply reactive terms. Treating the two hearings before the 
Commission together—the first hearing held on May 30, 2014, and the second, on 
July 25, 2014—the Court says that they involved “some elements of a clear and 
impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated” Phillips to 
refuse to make Craig and Mullins the wedding celebration cake they wanted.19 
According to the Court, the record of the Commission’s proceedings reveal that 
“hostility” toward religion, and Phillips’s faith in particular, “surfaced” at both 
“formal, public hearings.”20 
Starting chronologically with the May 30, 2014 hearing, the Court explains that, 
during a “public[]” “conven[ing],” state “commissioners [at several points] endorsed 
the view that religious views cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or 
commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully 
welcome in Colorado’s business community.”21 Bolstering this interpretation of the 
record, the Court points to statements by an unnamed civil rights commissioner—pure 
bureaucrat in this sense, but also importantly an adjudicator—saying in public and for 
the official record “that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but [he] cannot 
act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’”22 This is worse 
than it may initially sound, the Court explains, for no sooner does the commissioner 
offer these thoughts than “[a] few moments later,” in slightly different language, 
repeats them.23 
If you find yourself puzzled, not yet seeing the anti-religious bigotry the opinion 
is highlighting, do not be alarmed. The opinion, having rehearsed these remarks, itself 
affirms that they may be understood in a wholly anodyne light. On one view, the Court 
acknowledges, these statements merely indicate that Phillips, from the commissioner’s 
perspective, had an obligation to accommodate Craig and Mullins under state law 
regardless of his religious beliefs. Here the commissioner would be understood to say 
 
17  Id. at 1723–24, 1729–30. 
18  Id. at 1723. Indeed, the constitutional rot that Masterpiece Cakeshop sees is so deep that it 
declines to send the case back for a do-over. It sets “the order [of the Commission] . . . aside” 
and “invalidate[s]” the state court’s enforcement of the Commission’s order, closing the book 
shut on this chapter of the proceedings. Id. at 1732. Thoughtful, if brief, discussion on this point 
is in Flanders & Olivera, supra note 2, at 174–75. 
19  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (both dates and quoted language). 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5
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that Phillips’s “refus[al] to provide services [to Craig and Mullins] based on [their] 
sexual orientation [is unlawful], regardless of [his] . . . personal[, religious] views.”24  
No sooner is this understanding noted, however, than it is set against another, in 
which the commissioner’s observations entail an anti-religious attack. “On the other 
hand,” the Court continues, the commissioner’s statements “might be seen as 
inappropriate and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for 
Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced.”25 
In saying this, the Court’s opinion is not setting two equally available interpretive 
options on the table. Rather, the opinion is actively framing its own case that the 
Commission proceedings against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop involved anti-
religious bias, a reading of the record that takes fuller shape as the opinion engages 
“comments that followed” at the second public hearing of the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission in July 2014, a few months later on.26   
Almost luckily, the commissioner’s remarks at this second public hearing, quoted 
by the Court at some length, expressly reach back to what was said in the first public 
hearing, making them, by their own terms, a continuation of “what we[, the 
commissioners,] said in the hearing or the last meeting.”27 This collapse of time, space, 
and thought, which unifies two otherwise distinct legal events, turns out not to be all 
that significant. It is the observations that follow this looking-back, the observations 
independently made at the second Commission hearing, that ultimately serve as the 
touchstone for the Court’s decision that Masterpiece Cakeshop involves a scene of 
state-based, anti-religious discrimination that must, constitutionally, be addressed, and 
that is, formally speaking, more fundamental to the case’s disposition than whatever 
private and statutorily-appointed discrimination Craig and Mullins suffered at 
Phillips’s and Masterpiece Cakeshop’s hands. 
The commissioner’s remarks during the July 2014 hearing being as important as 
they are to the Court’s disposition of Masterpiece Cakeshop, and in its view so harmful 
that they drive the Court to overturn the entire proceedings against Phillips and his 
bakery, they are worth quoting at the exact same length as they appear in the Court’s 
opinion. Hear the commissioner speak:  
“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last 
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds 
of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be 
 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  There are recognizable parallels between Masterpiece Cakeshop’s aggressive reading 
protocol and the one featured in Romer v. Evans. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 626–
36 (1996). 
27  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. The commissioners quoted by the Court’s 
opinion at the two Commission hearings are different. By name, the commissioner quoted by 
the Court at the first hearing was Commissioner Raju Jairam, and at the second hearing, 
Commissioner Diann Rice. See Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and 
the New Minorities, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 274–75 (2019) (naming the commissioners); Leslie 
Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 139–40 
(same). 
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the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of 
situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify 
discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric 
that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.”28 
After quoting this language, the Court repeats the comments it considers 
disparaging to religion: when the commissioner said that using religion “to justify 
discrimination” is “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use 
to—to use their religion to hurt others.”29 From the Court’s perspective, its own 
repetition of the very language that generates the constitutional injury does not 
redouble but repairs it. It does this by rejecting the thought that the commissioner was 
taking a constitutionally permissible normative stance in the course of the 
proceedings, saying in basic form something like this: Faith ought to be about love 
and caring for others, and, therefore, invoking religion to justify discrimination 
darkens faith’s name in problematic ways that the state remains free to regulate. 
The Court’s opinion is clear that the commissioner’s remarks insult religion in a 
double sense. “To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces of 
rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: 
by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—
something insubstantial and even insincere.”30 
Leave aside the opinion’s curious, if common, understanding of “rhetoric” in order 
to focus on its deeper didacticism, along with its sense of how unavoidably wounding 
for a person of faith like Phillips the commissioner’s remarks are. In the Court’s 
opinion, the commissioner’s remarks are, without question, harmful. 
The opinion’s instruction and simple conviction on this point are notable 
handiwork for other reasons. In certain faithful circles, Justice Kennedy’s own pre-
Masterpiece Cakeshop efforts delivering and securing constitutional rights for LGBT 
persons achieved their disapproved-of advances through what amounted to a 
homologous and practically indistinguishable set of anti-religious insults. The entire 
line of cases from Romer v. Evans to Lawrence v. Texas to United States v. Windsor 
to Obergefell v. Hodges constitutionally set back the religious views and traditional 
moral values that had long supported a broad and traditional sexual morality that 
condemned all non-marital sexuality, including sodomy, as sin, as dangerous to the 
social fabric, hence properly public offenses, while holding up marriage as an article 
of faith and definition as the union of one (bio) man to one (bio) woman as husband 
and wife.31 From this point of view, the Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay decisions, 
certainly most emphatically from Lawrence on to Obergefell, which variously likened 
and ultimately equated sodomitical sexual relations with cross-sexed intimacies 
 
28  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 
(2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See 
also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 142–43 (noting continuities between the 
Supreme Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay rights decisions and the positions expressed in Civil 
Rights Commission hearings).  
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between husbands and wives in two-in-one-flesh unions in marital bedrooms across 
the nation, were their own offenses to religious and moral values that far exceeded a 
rhetorical insult to religion. The body of Justice Kennedy’s lesbian and gay rights 
jurisprudence thus not only refused to give religious or traditional moral values the 
political respects that those who subscribed to them believed they were due and that 
everyone knows they had long enjoyed, but also, as many understood those decisions 
(some hissing, some cheering), the cases in this line diminished religious views and 
moral values when announcing the laws they were declaring unconstitutional were 
grounded in no more than what, in constitutional terms, appeared as animus or 
irrationality.32 Painting religious views and moral values supporting limits on lesbian 
and gay rights, along with other anti-gay sentiments, as hateful or crazy in 
constitutional terms, hence inconsistent with the Constitution’s public morality, 
regardless of the historical dominance and sway they enjoyed, the Court’s and Justice 
Kennedy’s own pro-lesbian-and-gay jurisprudence registered with many people of 
faith and conservative moralists in exactly the same key as the commissioner’s 
remarks now register with the Court: as state action entailing unconstitutional, anti-
religious insult.33 Many liberal, libertarian, and progressive supporters—irreligionists 
and immoralists perhaps above all—understood and secretly cheered these aspects of 
that body of law. 
Set against these understandings of his constitutional legacy, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s didacticism about the commissioner’s observations on religion extends 
beyond its pedantry—a pedantry that joins it to the larger pedantic through-line in 
Justice Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence.34 It is also an effort that operates, 
 
32  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (1996) (“[The sheer breadth of the law] is so discontinuous 
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus 
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”); see also, 
e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770 (2013) (noting how § 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) was unconstitutionally animus-based). 
33  On “hateful” and “crazy” in the relevant constitutional sense, see, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 
636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”); id. at 
645 (“The Court’s portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled 
‘gay-bashing’ is so false as to be comical.”); see also, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 795 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (describing it as a “lie” “that only those with hateful hearts could have voted ‘aye’ 
on this Act”); id. at 798 (reading Windsor as describing Congress’s opposition to same-sex 
marriage as a “hateful moral judgment”); id. at 800 (describing Windsor as indicating Congress 
acted “irrationally and hatefully” when passing DOMA); id. at 795–96 (noting how 
extraordinary the charge of irrationality, or a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group,” is, and describing the position as creating and maintaining “the illusion of the Act’s 
supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob”). On “insult,” see, e.g., Romer, 517 
U.S. at 652 (“To suggest, for example, that this constitutional amendment springs from nothing 
more than ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group’ . . . is nothing short of 
insulting.”); see also, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to which the majority 
feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate. . . . These apparent assaults on the 
character of fairminded people will have an effect, in society and in court.”).  
34  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data 
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret 
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 
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consciously or not, to restore constitutional faith, to make amends with people of 
conservative faith and moral traditionalists who found the Court’s reasoning in earlier 
pro-LGBT opinions insulting and discriminatory against them. Interestingly, the 
apologia’s structure bears an uncanny resemblance to the form of projection widely 
seen operating in cases of gay panic, in which someone else is blamed and punished 
for thoughts and desires that “are properly one’s own.”35 Here, in a panic involving 
religious rights, the commissioner’s remarks are pinned and blamed for what Justice 
Kennedy’s own writings had previously said and done.36 Form aside, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s instruction on anti-religious insult and discrimination demonstrates that 
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court, may have achieved a new (or anyway, a 
different) level of understanding of the relationship between pro-lesbian-and-gay 
sentiment and anti-religious and anti-morality discrimination.37 Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s constitutional repudiation of the commissioner’s remarks in this sense 
reads not as self-condemnation but rather as expiation, a release achieved not by 
formally apologizing and repudiating the pro-lesbian-and-gay constitutional opinions 
that many religionists and moralists found insulting, hurtful, and plainly wrong, but 
rather by cutting short their replication in this case, which underscores their ongoing 
constitutional importance and the challenges and imperatives of state accommodations 
of them. 
If this is right, Masterpiece Cakeshop involves a return to thinking that guided 
Justice Kennedy’s first major pro-lesbian-and-gay rights opinion, Romer v. Evans, 
which like this new ruling, of course, involved Colorado’s anti-discrimination rules 
and state-based discrimination related to them.38 Just as Romer disavowed what was 
widely taken as the open season for anti-lesbian and anti-gay discrimination 
announced by the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,39 which 
sanctioned making homosexuals criminal outcasts, Masterpiece Cakeshop repudiates 
the reverberations sent out from the Supreme Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay rulings 
from Romer on, most notably Obergefell, and the suggestion many perceived in those 
cases that they reflected an elevation of secular liberal political values over and with 
whatever effects on religion and traditional morality the people and governors of a 
given jurisdiction would allow. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s correspondence with 
Romer’s limiting logics is thus almost predictably visible in various expressions 
Masterpiece Cakeshop uses, including its suggestion that the commissioner’s 
statements “implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in 
Colorado’s business community” are inconsistent with a wide and welcoming view of 
 
35  See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 183, 
195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2003) (describing gay panic as “a way of 
punishing someone else for desires that are properly one’s own”). See also Cynthia Lee, The 
Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 475 (2008) (discussing “gay panic”). 
36  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
37  Compare this to the perspective expressed in United States v. Windsor, where the Court’s 
opinion describes the evolution both of general thinking and, more concretely, public sentiment 
in New York State on same-sex marriage, a description that also might be taken as an account 
of Justice Kennedy’s own. 570 U.S. at 763–64. 
38  Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24 (describing Colorado law as it existed at the time).  
39  478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
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political community, belonging, and equal concern and respect on display in Romer, 
here turned to protect people of faith and moralists from the exuberant operations of 
the liberalism promoted by the Court’s pro-LGBT jurisprudence.40 While the Court’s 
pro-LGBT caselaw unmistakably prohibits faith-based and moral views about 
homosexuality and the unequal treatment of lesbians and gay men from defining the 
outputs of democratic political processes—requiring the state to treat lesbians and gay 
men just like their cross-sex counterparts—Masterpiece Cakeshop teaches that the 
cases in that line in no way stand for the proposition that conservative people of faith 
and their religions, or traditional moralists and their moralities, may be subject to 
treatment as political outcasts who must endure insulting, disparaging, hurtful, and 
discriminatory treatment by lesbians, gay men, and their political allies, whom the 
Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay rights decisions have given a boost. Equality, not 
hierarchy, is Masterpiece Cakeshop’s message in this respect. Faith and morality may 
operate in the constitutionally animus-based and/or irrational ways the Court’s cases 
had declared, but calling faith and morality out for those possibilities doesn’t, pro 
tanto, amount to a warrant for the hateful disrespect and discrimination that the 
Colorado civil rights commissioner showed Phillips, dubbing religion a “despicable 
piece[] of rhetoric,” maybe “the most despicable . . . that people can use to . . . to hurt 
others.”41 If Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion aggressively attacks on 
this point, and if those attacks bear the hallmarks of a projection that distances the 
opinion from the ideas that the commissioner expressed, this may be a reason why: 
Saying things this way preserves the ground that the Court’s earlier pro-LGBT 
decisions cleared and claimed while simultaneously clarifying that those cases will 
not operate to authorize an open season on religionists or moralists who agree with 
Phillips. Of course, if this is what Masterpiece Cakeshop is about, if it is designed in 
this way to secure Justice Kennedy’s pro-LGBT legacy into the future, it may be seen 
to involve a full-circle return to the seemingly humble origins of Justice Kennedy’s 
pro-LGBT rights jurisprudence in Romer v. Evans.42 Or—and this line of thought may 
be more accurate—it may mean that Masterpiece Cakeshop contains the signs of 
personal melodrama, even psychodrama, of a sort that has characterized important 
strands of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, revealing Masterpiece Cakeshop to be, 
 
40  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018). 
41  Id. 
42 Saying this this way, of course, is to talk about Justice Kennedy’s LGBT rights 
jurisprudence during his tenure on the Supreme Court. Formally, his LGBT rights jurisprudence 
began earlier, when he was on the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 
792 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion by Kennedy, C.J.) (upholding as rational against constitutional 
attack a Navy rule that served as predicate for discharging enlisted persons with “otherwise fine 
performance record[s]” who “admitted engaging in homosexual acts”); see also, e.g., Sullivan 
v. I.N.S., 772 F.2d 609, 609–10 (9th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Kennedy, C.J.) (affirming decision 
by Board of Immigration Appeals to deny an application by a gay male Australian to suspend 
his deportation from the U.S. on the grounds, inter alia, that it would cause “extreme hardship” 
to him and to the U.S. citizen man he had married after they “obtained a marriage license and 
participated in a marriage ceremony conducted by a minister in Colorado”); cf. also United 
States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 989 (9th Cir. 1978); Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 530 
F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1976) (opinion of Jameson, J.), vacated sub nom. McDonald v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Soc’y for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906 
(per curiam) (9th Cir. 1975). 
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psychologically anyway, maximally egotistical and personally immodest, about 
Justice Kennedy and his role in history as much as about the rights and interests the 
case involves.43 On this view, the question to ask is how likely it would be that an 
egoistic decision like this would also turn out, on close inspection, to be 
jurisprudentially minimalist. 
Precisely at the point where this question opens up, Masterpiece Cakeshop doubles 
down more fully to expose the sweep of its formal holding on anti-religious 
discrimination. The process unfolds as the opinion draws out for condemnation yet 
another aspect of the Colorado civil rights commissioner’s brief remarks. Beyond 
quoting the commissioner’s characterization of religion as “despicable” “rhetoric,” the 
Court’s opinion explains that “[t]he commissioner even went so far as to compare 
Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and 
the Holocaust.”44 The opinion doesn’t deny that slavery and the Holocaust were at 
times defended in religious terms—nor could it—but it does issue an extremely stern 
rebuke.45 “This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn 
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s anti-discrimination law—
a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual 
orientation.”46 One sign of the emotional intensity that is actually moving beneath the 
surface of the Court’s seemingly wholly affectless scolding is the parapraxis it 
commits. Justice Kennedy’s opinion says that Colorado’s anti-discrimination law is 
“a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual 
orientation.”47 But that is exactly the opposite of what Colorado’s anti-discrimination 
 
43  Compare the depiction of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges as 
found in Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in the case. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2627–28, 2629–31, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Rosen, supra note 
4. 
44  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
45  Sketches of the relevant point, with sources, are in Stephen M. Feldman, Having Your Cake 
and Eating It Too? Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 35, 52–
56 (2018), and Murray, supra note 27, at 276–77. 
46  Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16–111, slip op. at 14 (June 4, 2018). This is the original 
language from the Court. The development of this language in subsequent versions of the 
Court’s opinion is traced infra note 47. 
47  Id. (emphasis added). The italicized language appears in the initial slip opinion issued on 
June 4, 2018, and in the revised, hence corrected, slip opinion issued that same day. Compare 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16–111, slip op. at 14 (June 4, 2018), with Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
No. 16–111, slip op. at 14 (June 4, 2018) (rev. slip op.). The language was finally corrected in 
the revised slip opinion issued on June 13, 2018. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16–111, slip op. 
at 14 (June 13, 2018) (rev. slip op.). The full sentence now officially reads: “This sentiment is 
inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral 
enforcement of Colorado’s anti-discrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination 
on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
The textual indications on this passage notwithstanding, it remains true that a typographical 
error, even on a significant point, twice missed, can be just and only that, even if, as here, 
attending to the emotional intensity of the text in its original form gives rise to a different 
reading. 
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law does. Colorado law does not “protect[] discrimination on the basis of religion [or] 
. . . sexual orientation.” It offers protections against discrimination on these grounds.48 
After condemning and repudiating the commissioner’s remarks—and thus issuing 
a bold warning to all government officials, who are now on a renewed and heightened 
notice not to say hateful, hence discriminatory, hence unconstitutional, things about 
the religious views of people of faith or, one presumes, about traditional morality—
the Court chastises those who remained silent in the face of this discriminatory 
likening of Phillips’s faith to support for slavery or Nazism or both.49 Formally, the 
opinion mobilizes the refusal of any government official at the time of the remarks or 
later, in subsequent legal proceedings, to disavow what the commissioner said.50 It 
treats all this silence as part of the matrix of constitutional considerations for declaring 
what the commissioner put on the record, hence what the state did and then didn’t do, 
to be constitutionally offensive: harm not only to Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop 
but also to the nation and our shared national values as reflected in the Constitution. 
Thus does the Court’s decision observe: “For these reasons [involving both the initial 
statement likening Phillips’s invocation of his religion to support for slavery and the 
Holocaust, and the silence in its wake], the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that 
these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s 
adjudication of Phillips’ case.”51 
This overstated conclusion—at once both banal and marvelous, the Court’s 
conclusion being, after all, defined entirely by its choice—is immediately paired with 
an observation that reveals its looming insecurity as a ruling that’s compelled. While 
the essence of the Court’s case that the commission proceedings lacked the “fairness 
and impartiality” required by the Constitution has been fully made by this point in the 
opinion, the Court shores up this conclusion by adding some additional weight to it. 
The Court notes the comparatively different treatment Phillips received at the 
Commission’s hands from cases involving “other bakers who objected to . . . requested 
[custom-made] cake[s] on the basis of [their] conscience[s]” but who, unlike Phillips, 
“prevailed before the Commission” against discrimination claims.52 If these cases and 
their comparison to Phillips’s loom large in exchanges found in the other opinions in 
the case,53 they function in the majority opinion’s argument as a supplemental set of 
 
48  As described supra note 47, this is the position expressed in the current version of the 
opinion. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
49  A refinement of this point, on the obligation of government officials, which takes account 
of Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), appears below. See infra notes 70–72 and 
accompanying text. 
50  This excludes Supreme Court oral arguments, where Justice Kennedy asked the state’s 
representative for and effectively got the disavowal that he was after, if too late. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 51–57, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16–111) (discussing 
the point). 
51  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. 
52  Id. 
53  Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring) (discussing 
and comparing the cases), with Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734–40 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (same).  
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considerations—a constitutional add-on—that amounts to yet “[a]nother indication of 
[anti-religious] hostility” at the Commission, which had, in its essential form, been 
established based on the record of the administrative proceedings in the case.54 
1. An Assessment 
The tactical bid to view Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion as a 
narrow, shallow, and modest ruling largely depends upon the sense that the Court’s 
conclusion is closely tethered to the record, hence tailored to the facts of the case, 
hence how manageable the decision’s requirement is. It seems very likely now that 
public officials at public hearings in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s wake will not slip up so 
readily and talk about religion in the ways the commissioner at the second public 
hearing in this case did nor, for that matter, remain silent in the face of such now-
obviously and unconstitutionally offensive remarks. Initially, there’s reason to wonder 
how exactly it is that altering and superintending the speech and silence practices of 
public officials across the country in such a highly centralized and coordinated fashion 
like this lends itself as an act of power to being described as modest. In other 
comparative terms, it may prove true that Masterpiece Cakeshop maps a future in 
which it is seen to have picked absurdly low-hanging constitutional fruit the likes of 
which will not be seen again for some time, if ever. 
That possibility holds, but not as a superficial one-off proposition. The Court’s 
analysis of the record reflects a deeper, indeed an aggressive, normative solicitude for 
claims of anti-religious bias by state actors, a normativity that’s complexly situated 
within and related to a larger vision of the import of constitutionally safeguarded 
political pluralisms. In this sense, even those who highlight Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
minimalism as being intimately bound up with the record have to recognize that the 
normative points of view that coalesced and moved the Court to read the record in 
what seemed to so many a surprising, even misguided, way, do so in something of the 
spirit of wish-fulfillment. They want Masterpiece Cakeshop, with its reconstruction 
of the record as containing proof positive of anti-religious discrimination, to be a 
minimalist decision, even as they also have a sense, hence on some level know, that 
the normativities driving it suggest it can’t be or anyway stay that way. If the sorts of 
seemingly anodyne remarks in the record, all of which can be understood as stating a 
liberal view of the facts of how religious and moral convictions and practice must 
yield in the face of anti-discrimination norms, are readily construed as constitutionally 
illicit state action, how will anti-discrimination norms not give way as a matter of 
 
54 Id. at 1730 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Reinforcing this point and its 
understanding is how the Court restates the basis for its conclusion a bit later on, where these 
other cases make no appearance within the Court’s basic account of why the Free Exercise 
Clause was violated, and only operate as an add-on: “The official expressions of hostility to 
religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—comments that were not disavowed at the 
Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—
were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission’s disparate 
consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For 
these reasons, the order must be set aside.” Id. at 1732. Accord Feldman, supra note 45, at 42–
43 (expressing a similar view on the structure of this part of the Court’s decision). 
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constitutional right to religious views and moral values in other respects?55 In this 
sense, the effort to minimize the doctrinal significance of Masterpiece Cakeshop may 
be one way to avoid coming to terms with the fact that if what the Court says about 
the Commission proceedings is right—if what was said on the record, rounded out by 
silence, is anti-religious discrimination—then a great many liberals and progressives 
who share those views might be potential discriminators, too, who should check their 
own anti-religious impulses lest they act on them in ways amounting to unlawful 
private, or, depending on their statist authorities, state practice. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s ostensible minimalism must be deeply psychologically satisfying for 
those decidedly and proudly faithless liberals and progressives who, either openly or 
secretly, look down their noses at people, particularly conservatives, of faith and 
traditional moralists, or who otherwise feel justified within their positions of 
constitutional safety to exercise political power—including, at times, the massive 
powers of the state—over their religious and moralistic enemies to check their 
vanquished views in the public realm.  
Herein lies the worry: Lurking in Masterpiece Cakeshop may be the seeds of a 
larger heuristic that sharply lines up against the worldview that many liberals and 
progressives rightly understand Obergefell to have embraced and deployed. Should 
Masterpiece Cakeshop be anything other than a minimalist decision, the constitutional 
liberalism of the Court’s lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence may soon be subject to 
even more instability and challenge than it was previously or was otherwise thought 
to face.56 Following that, of course, or even before it, other aspects of existing civil 
rights structures may come under the same pressures.57 
More immediately, but no less auspiciously, to the extent Masterpiece Cakeshop 
is serious about its disapproval of anti-religious discrimination by the state and about 
its commitment to ensuring that political and legal, including adjudicative, processes 
subject to the First Amendment’s religious freedom strictures are not to be 
constitutionally suspect because “doubt” has been “cast . . . on the[ir] fairness and 
impartiality,”58 the Court’s decision in the case creates the conditions for conservatives 
of faith and for traditional moralists to insist upon constitutional inquiries in a range 
of cases in which their rights to act in conformity with their beliefs are limited by the 
government, testing the adequacy of the government’s justifications.59   
 
55  Saying this is to imagine different sorts of epistemologies within which this view holds. It 
is not to say that describing religion as “despicable” “rhetoric,” much less analogizing 
conservative religious views to those supporting slavery or the Holocaust, are, as a matter of 
fact, anodyne. There is a separate question on this line whether even if they are not, they warrant 
the constitutional conclusion Masterpiece Cakeshop reaches, and the remedy the Supreme Court 
orders in the case.  
56  See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, ___U.S.L.W. 
___ (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123). 
57  This obviously includes women’s reproductive rights. 
58  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. 
59  The results of these inquiries may not always be what conservatives of faith and traditional 
moralists might want, but the Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop may nevertheless be 
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Consistent with Masterpiece Cakeshop’s teaching, the press here may be made in 
relation to stray comments in the record and to punctuated silences about them, all of 
which may serve as grounds for a constitutional cause of action collateral to first-order 
legal proceedings. Nominally and formally, Masterpiece Cakeshop breaks no new 
legal ground here. State-based, anti-religious discrimination has long been verboten, 
at least on the books and at least insofar as the religions and moral values are 
mainstream. What Masterpiece Cakeshop does, though, is demonstrate the Court’s 
now-activated willingness to perform its sensitivities to claims of anti-religious or 
anti-morality bias in ways that show the Supreme Court to be in session—it’s open for 
business—when it comes to pro-religion and pro-morality understandings of religious 
and moral freedom claims.60 
This is not to say that Masterpiece Cakeshop could not be held to its apparent 
context. The decision, it might be said, is only for the unusual case in which the 
constitutional imperatives of fairness and impartiality toward religion and morality 
have been breached in anti-discrimination proceedings, which true to their own 
underlying commitments must be exquisitely fair, neutral, and beyond even the 
appearance of discrimination as between religion and irreligion. 
There’s more to say about this argument, but for now, one obvious problem with 
it is that the First Amendment’s religious non-discrimination principle on which 
Masterpiece Cakeshop sits—the basis for the Court’s declaration that Jack Phillips 
and his cakeshop, by extension, suffered state-based anti-religious discrimination—is 
not in principle limitable or limited to the anti-discrimination law setting. In every 
case in which religious-based or morality-based discrimination is advanced as a 
challenge to a governmental action, in every case in which state fairness and neutrality 
vis-à-vis religion or morality is potentially implicated, the First Amendment’s 
religious freedom guarantees are potentially in play. All state actors involved in 
official actions must now choose their words and silences with respect to religion and 
morality with constitutionally-sensitized care. Even casual remarks that to some 
liberal or progressive ears may sound utterly innocent, normatively innocuous, or 
otherwise harmless, may be held to be constitutionally beyond the pale, judged not (or 
no longer) by secularized liberal or progressive sensitivities and standards, but from 
within religious or moral worldviews as grounds for declaring a constitutional taint to 
governmental action. If so, Masterpiece Cakeshop may have announced the advent of 
a new era of “constitutional political correctness” respecting religion and morality.61 
 
distinctively empowering, giving them the opportunity to make strategic and tactical calls about 
when to seek judicial review and vindication of their rights claims. See supra note 56. 
60  Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging in the Time of the Extraordinary, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 533, 
540 (2010) (“Simply put, federal courts [after the 2000 election, in the era of Bush v. Gore] 
were open for business when it came to adjudicating election administration claims, and the 
post-2000 era witnessed an immense growth in election-related litigation”). Thanks to Dan 
Tokaji for noting the parallel thought. 
61  A similar point using the language of “etiquette” is suggested in Kendrick & Schwartzman, 
supra note 27, at 135 (“In our view, the Court erred by elevating matters of etiquette—the 
importance of appearing respectful and considerate—over giving a reasoned justification for 
resolving conflicts between religious liberty and antidiscrimination law.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
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The articulation of a reasonable faithful person or a reasonable moralist standard of 
and for First Amendment adjudications might not be far behind. 
While these prospects may generate a preliminary sense of dread among some 
liberals and progressives, they may also illuminate why many liberal and progressive 
audiences have not sought to attend more carefully and openly to the opinion’s deeper 
resonances.  
Still, to state what may initially sound a counterintuitive point, these highly 
negative prospects may also contain within them the seeds of much happier future 
news. Unless Masterpiece Cakeshop involves the abandonment of neutral principles 
of constitutional adjudication, its sensitivities to religious and moral perspectives as a 
basis for judging “doubt” about the “fairness and impartiality” of governmental 
proceedings are part and parcel of a ruling that also brings with it an announcement of 
a new era for adjudicating all manner of constitutional anti-discrimination claims that 
are or might be leveled against state actors involved in enforcing or adjudicating the 
enforcement of otherwise neutral and generally applicable legal rules.  
There’s no mystery about why this is. If the state processes of administration and 
adjudication must remain free of “doubt” about “the[ir] fairness and impartiality”62 in 
relation to the operation of neutral and generally applicable legal rules with respect to 
religion and morality, and if that doubt is to be judged from within the perspective 
from which it is launched, there’s no reason to suppose Masterpiece Cakeshop’s ruling 
on a religious-based right to non-discrimination shouldn’t apply consistently and with 
equal force to other kinds of constitutionally grounded anti-discrimination claims. The 
constitutional anti-discrimination norms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
being on a par with one another, the prospect that the case sets forth, of first-order 
legal proceedings being “set aside” in their entirety because of record evidence of 
statements and silences amounting to religious-based or morality-based 
discrimination, well, who could possibly miss the legal opportunities that this should 
open up?63 What lawyer seeking to challenge adverse governmental action, whether 
in a civil or a criminal setting, will not, indeed, should not, seize upon Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s teaching to assail stray remarks and silences of governmental actors, while 
saying of them—judged from the perspective of the claimant’s group—that they 
demonstrate a discriminatory attitude that casts “doubt” on the “fairness and 
impartiality” of state proceedings in ways that violate the Constitution?  
Think here, perhaps most obviously, about various claims of discrimination based 
on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, sexual orientation or identity, and maybe 
gender identity and expression, either alone or at their intersections, and how legal 
records of proceedings and other aspects of legal processes can be scoured and 
dissected for remarks that, to the uninitiated, might seem wholly innocuous, but that 
viewed from a sympathetic perspective, as in Masterpiece Cakeshop, particularly 
when strung together, tell a story of discrimination at least as persuasive as the one 
Masterpiece Cakeshop tells. Cards on the table: Even if Masterpiece Cakeshop’s story 
of anti-religious discrimination is not understood to be altogether compelling, and for 
many it isn’t, it still sets a strikingly low threshold, easily crossed, in countless other 
 
62  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. 
63  Needless to say, Masterpiece Cakeshop runs its religious freedom protections through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
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cases involving remarks that, to liberals and progressives, will sound much more 
clearly like they are evidence of other sorts of discrimination the Constitution 
presently outlaws.64   
All of this depends on the unexceptionable proposition that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
is announced within a rule of law system in which its own commitment to neutrality 
and generality of constitutional and legal rules is both not at all and also always in 
doubt. Assuming Herbert Wechsler’s views still find a receptive audience on the 
Supreme Court, it stands to reason that the more robustly the Court is inclined, as in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, to treat statements like those during the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission’s hearings as reflecting constitutionally actionable anti-religious bias, the 
more the decision throws open the door to a broad array of anti-discrimination 
challenges to first-order legal proceedings.65 This narrow, shallow, and modest little 
decision is thus an invitation to second-order re-litigation that seeks to set aside first-
order legal proceedings on constitutional anti-discrimination grounds. The question to 
ask when liberals and progressives are overheard cabining Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
why? Given their own and the Court’s own rule of law commitments, why aren’t they 
shouting “Charge!”?66 
Especially when Masterpiece Cakeshop sets the evidentiary bar for making out a 
discrimination claim where it does, and arguably as low. When, at the very least, 
everything that any government official says in his or her or their official capacities 
and in public on the record is in play as part of a constitutional discrimination suit.67 
Harder questions might soon involve the operative sweep of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
discriminatory-statement or approving-silence rule. When it does, the questions to be 
asked may begin with why only statements by public officials made in public and on 
the record count? What’s special about what is audibly recorded and placed on an 
official transcript? After Masterpiece Cakeshop, the pressure should soon be on to 
 
64  Consider in this regard Serial: You’ve Got Some Gauls, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20, 
2018), https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/2/youve-got-some-gauls. This move is available 
notwithstanding the ways in which many readers of Masterpiece Cakeshop take the decision to 
be one that broadly cuts in favor of religious conservatives. See generally, e.g., Berg, supra note 
9. 
65  Herbert Wechsler’s standard on this score remains standard. See generally Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
Importantly, it has not only been the critical legal studies set that warned against taking 
Weschler’s neutral principles too seriously. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Law According to 
Yale, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW 
417, 417 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985) (recalling how Eugene 
Rostow “chided [him] for taking Wechsler’s account of ‘neutral principles’ so seriously.”). 
66  This suggestion, directed at the Court, is in Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The 
Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 178 (2019) (“Now the Court should extend that 
approach beyond religious cases, and make discriminatory motivation against subordinate 
groups presumptively unconstitutional.”). 
67  Along these lines, consider Buck v. Gordon, No. 1:19-CV-286, 2019 WL 4686425, at *1, 
*11, *15 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2019) (focusing on statements by Michigan Attorney General 
Dana Nessel while on the campaign trail and linking subsequent official actions by Nessel as 
Attorney General to her earlier remarks in ways that liken them to statements adjudicated in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
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seek to hold minitrials about the meaning of an “inaudible” that’s officially recorded 
in a proceeding’s transcript but which those in attendance can attest had relevance to 
a discrimination claim. It is hard to see—if the “doubt” about the “fairness and 
impartiality” of a proceeding is where the constitutional game is—why proceedings 
in conference (or for that matter, a jury room, say) should not likewise be fair game. 
Ditto unofficial statements by public officials, say, to the media or on social media. 
Why shouldn’t they count as evidence of discrimination that casts doubt on the 
fairness and impartiality of a state proceeding? If the constitutional concern is what 
Masterpiece Cakeshop says it is—“doubt” about “the fairness and impartiality” of 
governmental proceedings—why shouldn’t all those remarks count as evidence every 
bit as much as silence that never makes its way onto the record? At some point, a 
supervening line must be and will be drawn to make this rule workable.68 But if the 
line isn’t principled, if it improperly applies to some but not all similarly situated 
discrimination claims, Masterpiece Cakeshop should be overturned—as an arbitrary, 
a political, and/or an unprincipled ruling. And if overturning Masterpiece Cakeshop 
is in fact the goal, as it is for many liberals and progressives, why relent so easily and 
accept the bid that this is a minimalist, fact-bound decision? Once the initial daze of 
this ruling, which many didn’t see coming, finally wears off, liberals and progressives 
may cease relinquishing what could be retooled as a powerful anti-discrimination 
weapon.69 
To be sure, Masterpiece Cakeshop may or may not prove to be a principled 
decision. For some, it has already plainly shown itself not to be, and for understandable 
reasons. Very quickly on the heels of this decision, the Court—in the first major 
opportunity available to it in the same Term—refused to take the principle of the case 
seriously and to apply it to governmental action that would’ve proven beyond any 
doubt its principle has sharp teeth that bite, cutting deep. To say this is to be thinking 
about Trump v. Hawaii, where the facts in evidence in the record seemed to many 
liberals and progressives, and to some conservatives, much more clearly than in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, an unassailable indication that governmental action, in the 
 
68  For one example, see 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, No. 16–CV–02372–MSK, 2019 WL 
4694159, at *911 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2019) (rejecting a “pre-enforcement challenge” to 
Colorado’s public accommodations law based on statements made by members of the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission adjudicated in Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
69  A similar press might involve the question of whether the relevant proceedings must entail 
something at least as legally, if not also socially, significant as a civil anti-discrimination ruling, 
which, of course, is not criminal, though it may partake of some of the attributes of it within 
regulatory logics and the social imagination. Think here of the ways in which, for example, sex 
discrimination rules in the context of Title IX proceedings, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018), on college 
campuses often operate with and struggle against a criminal law cast. If the stakes of the 
proceedings are high enough, the consequences severe enough, it might be that discriminatory 
statements on the record or silences related to them become actionable across the board, or it 
might be that different rules are put in play. These ideas follow from Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
holding’s teaching, read against the backdrop of our rule-of-law system’s rules of regularity and 
equal treatment, with their constitutional expressions—but the text of the Court’s opinion in the 
case doesn’t provide all that many helpful clues, finally, on how they should be resolved. The 
Court’s order in the case is certainly telling of the possibilities notwithstanding the effects on 
Craig and Mullins or the public at large in relation to the vindication of anti-discrimination 
claims. 
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form of President Donald J. Trump’s “travel ban,” was traceable to anti-religious, 
specifically, anti-Muslim, sentiment.70 How, if the remarks by a nameless state 
commissioner and the silences by other commissioners and later by other state officials 
who reviewed the Commission’s decision—how if all that was so obviously anti-
religious discrimination violative of the First Amendment could the national travel 
ban involved in Trump v. Hawaii stand in light of Donald J. Trump’s and others’ anti-
Muslim remarks and the loud silences in their wake? Did they not, to many people’s 
ways of thinking, cast “doubt” on the fairness and neutrality of the governmental 
processes that produced the positive law rule being challenged in the case? This was 
at least partly, if not exactly, what Justice Sonia Sotomayor had in mind when, in the 
course of her Trump v. Hawaii dissent, she tapped on Masterpiece Cakeshop as 
precedent that required the conclusion that the travel ban could not withstand a First 
Amendment constitutional analytic.71 
What to make of Trump v. Hawaii as a case that reveals something about 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s meaning? Does Trump v. Hawaii already teach that 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is unprincipled, the empty personal preference politics of the 
Justices at its core? Perhaps it does. There’s no point in strenuously denying it.  
It is also possible, however, indeed it is quite easy, to distinguish Trump v. Hawaii 
as a case about presidential powers operating at their height, at the intersection of 
foreign affairs powers and immigration in a distinctive way.72 Everyone realistically 
knew that, at a certain point, then-candidate Trump’s anti-Muslim remarks, revealing 
the anti-Muslim motivations behind his travel bans, would eventually be washed out 
by rules of regular order involving the Executive Office and intergovernmental 
processes in the executive branch. Everyone realistically knew about the inter-branch 
reluctance the U.S. Supreme Court would manifest in relation to a request for a 
declaration that a sitting President of the United States had, constitutionally speaking, 
manifested unlawful animus or irrationality toward those of the Muslim faith.  
 
70  A careful expression of this view is in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). For a more direct account, see infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
71  In her dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Sotomayor observes that Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s  
principles should apply equally here. In both instances, the question is whether a 
government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision that 
affects individuals’ fundamental religious freedom. But unlike 
in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission was found to have acted 
without “the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires,” the government 
actors in this case will not be held accountable for breaching the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of religious neutrality and tolerance. Unlike in Masterpiece, where the 
majority considered the state commissioners’ statements about religion to be 
persuasive evidence of unconstitutional government action, the majority here 
completely sets aside the President’s charged statements about Muslims as 
irrelevant. 
Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
72  See, e.g., id. at 2409 (majority opinion) (locating Presidential action “in the context of 
international affairs and national security,” and noting the propriety of judicial deference in this 
setting); id. at 2419–20 (same, while noting separation of powers concerns). 
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The point here is not to get lost in digression, as significant as it absolutely is. It is 
instead to affirm the strength of the operative norm pushing the Supreme Court in 
Trump v. Hawaii, even the Court’s liberals, to see the dignity of the office of the 
President of the United States in a context like the one the travel ban litigation touched 
on, and to imagine the Constitution requires greater deference to a processed travel 
ban, indeed much greater deference, than the comments of a state administrative 
apparatchik, or the silences related to it, by those who are all in the Supreme Court’s 
direct constitutional line-of-command. Trump v. Hawaii doesn’t treat Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s anti-discrimination rule as controlling, as many believed it should have, 
but that refusal needn’t (doesn’t) (shouldn’t) be imagined to cut short the operation of 
an otherwise still quite broadly principled understanding and application of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. One version of the doctrinal schema might thus look like this: 
Over here is Masterpiece Cakeshop, with its anti-discrimination rule operating as a 
powerful and properly principled ruling, and over there, at the far, outer edge of that 
rule’s operation, is Trump v. Hawaii. If that’s how the cases are seen to relate to one 
another, and this isn’t to validate either decision, there’s still ample ground on which 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s anti-discrimination rule can and should, as a matter of neutral 
principles, function. All that ground is abandoned, all that ground is given up, 
however, if Masterpiece Cakeshop is taken to be a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling. 
Gone with that understanding is the opportunity to leverage the boomerang-like 
quality of Masterpiece Cakeshop as a case about religious discrimination benefitting 
many others who belong to other subordinated groups protected by the Constitution 
who have constitutionally grounded anti-discrimination claims to make. 
B. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “Shadow Rulings” 
Argument to this point has operated by calling the case for reading Masterpiece 
Cakeshop as a narrow, shallow, and modest opinion into question by focusing on the 
opinion’s central holding that Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop were the 
victims of unconstitutional state discrimination on the basis of religion. Here the 
understanding of the law of the case is expanded based on legal propositions—call 
them “shadow rulings”—found within Masterpiece Cakeshop that carry demonstrable 
authoritative legal force. As those rulings come into focus, the reasons for doubting 
the constitutional channel that Masterpiece Cakeshop cuts is narrow, shallow, or 
modest are amplified. 
At the outset, it bears repeating that Masterpiece Cakeshop expressly tells its 
readers that it is bracketing the “difficult questions” and the deep and broad clashes of 
values that the case involves.73 That is partly true. Masterpiece Cakeshop doesn’t 
openly air, examine, and settle those “difficult questions” to their fundaments. But the 
suggestion entails some misdirection, a ruse. What the opinion brackets, it also 
detectably unbrackets—and engages—in important respects. 
As Masterpiece Cakeshop characterizes the “difficult questions” it purports to be 
placing beyond its reach, it sketches a picture of the U.S. Kulturkampf—with its 
recognizable friend/enemy dynamics and partisan, identity-based positions reflecting 
very different ways of life—that the Court’s earlier pro-lesbian-and-gay rights 
decisions weighed in on. The picture of the Kulturkampf in Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
 
73  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
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basically the same one supplied by Justice Antonin Scalia in Romer v. Evans, if 
normatively updated to function in a new time.74 In one corner, the “difficult 
questions” in Masterpiece Cakeshop involve the ongoing struggles for recognition of 
the liberty, the equal dignity and worth, and the first-class citizenship status of “gay 
persons who are, or wish to be, married.”75 The total victory of the right to marry 
project over the basic terms of LGBT rights within this description is unmistakable. 
In the other corner are the religious and speech liberty claims advanced by 
conservative religionists and traditional moralists whose faithful and moral visions 
remain steadfastly opposed to the right-to-marry-centered lesbian and gay rights 
program. Thus does the Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop frame the conflict 
it involves in these highly partisan, oppositional, and concretely personal terms: The 
rights and interests of gay persons who were or who wished to be married, like the gay 
male couple in the case, Craig and Mullins, with their bids for full and equal access to 
public life reflected both in their marriage vows and their claims under Colorado’s 
state accommodations law, are pitted against the rights and interests of Phillips and 
his cakeshop, the stand-ins for the constitutional rights of faithful conservatives and 
traditional moralists who wish to practice and live their sincerely held views and 
values and, recalling the First Amendment artistic freedom claim in the case, to speak 
artistically through their faithful, moral work. 
The Court’s framing of the contest that Masterpiece Cakeshop involves, while not 
unproblematic, is not without its uses.76 High among them is how the Court’s 
understanding of the deep and difficult questions the case sits atop is broadly 
continuous with how the partisans involved in the case and the broader publics to 
which they are responsive and related have likewise tended to view the case, its issues, 
and their implications. Indeed, the line-up of the parties and their social identities 
subtend the full range of legal and political engagement with the issues that the case 
involves outside the constitutional judicial decisional context.  
As significantly, the Court’s framing of the difficult questions the case involves 
and their partisan-sidedness tracks the Court’s own way of keeping score in relation 
to the central ruling and the shadow rulings in the case, which benefit the different 
sides of the enduringly deep clashes through offerings that are plainly designed as 
 
74  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has mistaken 
a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the 
manifestation of a ‘bare . . . desire to harm’ homosexuals, but is rather a modest attempt by 
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a 
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.” (citation omitted)). 
75  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
76  Not unproblematic in the sense that it leaves to the margins the rights of “gay persons” 
who wish to have nothing to do with marriage, as well as of the equal stature and rights of 
lesbians, bisexuals, transfolk, and many others with whom they’re allied. It also brackets the 
deeper considerations of substantive equality to which LGBT constitutional rights are related. 
No less significantly, this perspective is not unproblematic in the sense that it misses the ways 
in which people of faith don’t always line up against lesbians and gay men and LGBT equality, 
and that even within those communities are found religiously faithful people, and even some 
conservative religionists and traditional moralists. See supra note 3. This, of course, also means 
that there are LGBT people (and of course conservative religionists and traditional moralists) 
on both sides of the Kulturkampf the Court describes. 
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magnets inviting all the Kulturkampf’s players to identify with the opinion, the Court, 
and the Constitution by extension, while recognizing their shared and convergent legal 
authority finally to settle the deep clash of values the Kulturkampf involves within a 
larger shared national project of Americanness. Neither “side” in the ongoing culture 
wars—which are cultural wars, after all—emerges singularly victorious in the case. 
No side, with the Court’s aid, vanquishes its foe via the sword of constitutional 
justice.77 Far from it, the Court’s opinion doesn’t openly command the warring parties 
to beat their own swords into ploughshares.78 What it does do is announce 
constitutional promises that invite the parties to accept Masterpiece Cakeshop as 
staking out its own reasonable and reasonably balanced accommodations of highly 
divergent and antagonistic positions—accommodations that everyone might accept 
and respect going forward, de-escalating the conflict and eliminating its most highly 
contested aspects from the realm of ordinary law and politics. The war that politics is, 
is subtly but recognizably coded as dangerous to the national peace.79 
Reflecting these broad aspirations, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s practice of 
constitutional lawmaking is both smooth and sticky. Smooth in the serene sense that 
Masterpiece Cakeshop means to reduce some of the enduring partisan frictions that 
might otherwise manifest, flaring up, both legally and politically in potentially socially 
problematic ways. It is sticky, by contrast, in the sense that the decision announces 
legal positions that, in their authoritative reasonableness, are meant to hold the Court 
to a neutral course somewhere in the middle between, without picking, the 
Kulturkampf’s sides, when the Court is asked to flesh out some other aspects of the 
decision’s deeper shades of meanings in future cases. As it happens, this stickiness 
also supplies what amount to reasons for lower courts and other governmental and 
nongovernmental readers to attend to, and to abide, its call for reasonableness. The 
multi-sided position mapping Masterpiece Cakeshop does in the shadow of its 
religious discrimination ruling is lawmaking in Holmes’s predictive sense.80 
1. The Pro-LGBT Rulings 
Begin with what Masterpiece Cakeshop delivers to the Court’s model of lesbians 
and gay men—“gay persons who are, or wish to be, married”—along with other “gay 
persons” and not-gay others who are nominally situated on this side of the case’s 
clash.81 (This opinion is short on intersectional thinking: It doesn’t actively imagine 
religious and moral liberals or lesbian and gay conservative religionists or traditional 
moralists.) Represented by Craig and Mullins, whose anti-discrimination claim against 
 
77  There are more than two sides, obviously, even if the Court doesn’t recognize them. 
78  For this line of thought, see infra Parts II.B–II.D. 
79  This isn’t meant as any kind of categorical embrace of Carl Schmitt’s views on politics. 
See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 1996). 
80  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law.”). 
81  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 
(2018). 
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Phillips and his cakeshop suffers defeat, they receive other rewards, indeed significant 
treasure, on the way to that disposition.  
At the broadest level, and without forgetting how the Court’s recognition of 
Phillips’s constitutional anti-discrimination claim may give them a boost, too, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop enthusiastically and repeatedly endorses the decisions in which 
the Court has previously announced pro-LGBT equality, dignity, and rights-based 
victories. Victories, of course, that reached their high watermark in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, and that have promised lesbians and gay men constitutional rank as first-class 
citizens entitled to fully equal treatment under law. That line of cases and the 
principles they have announced are, in fact, both the occasion for Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, and, notwithstanding the victory Phillips achieves in the case, its ongoing 
doctrinal teaching. 
There is plenty to criticize in this, and not only from conservative religious or 
traditionally moralistic points of view. Powerful critiques have already been offered 
of the normativities that undergird and animate the Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay 
rulings, variously focusing on how these gains have been accomplished as a result of 
the Court’s endorsement of ideologically driven and hierarchically inflected thinking 
about sex, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and class, among other grounds.82 Recognizing 
the formal equality conventionalism of existing lesbian and gay rights under the 
federal Constitution, hence the constitutional parity between same-sex and cross-sex 
relationships and marriages, and lesbians and gay men and heterosexuals more 
generally, which Masterpiece Cakeshop fortifies, there is no denying the widely 
recognized significance and value of the decision’s reaffirmation of the Court’s 
lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence by those who have in the past and by those who 
may in the future wish to arrange their lives in relation to these normative intimacy-
focused marks, and by those who likewise see that the politically liberal state can have 
no good reason for nonneutrally excluding lesbians and gay men and same-sex couples 
from the traditional institutions of public and private life. 
While, from one perspective, the gain here may appear minimal and formalistic—
exactly what one would not just insist upon but take for granted based on ordinary 
applications of stare decisis—Masterpiece Cakeshop’s reaffirmation of the Court’s 
existing lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence mustn’t be too quickly dismissed. For 
Masterpiece Cakeshop to make clear that the Supreme Court’s lesbian and gay rights 
caselaw is robustly good law is highly significant. This is not simply because of the 
powerful dissents filed from that positive jurisprudence, including in Obergefell, 
which insisted in different ways, often in eruptive rhetoric, that none of these cases is 
constitutionally legitimate, all, and perhaps none more so than Obergefell, being 
wholly lawless power grabs by Justices described as hellbent on dominating the nation 
 
82  These perspectives are variously reflected in, among other sources, Katherine M. Franke, 
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); R.A. 
Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (2015); Alexander 
Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider and Outsider Again: Interest 
Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT Identity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521 (2015); 
Praatika Prasad, More Color More Pride: Addressing Structural Barriers to Interracial LGBTQ 
Loving, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 89 (2018);  Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality & 
Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010 (2014); Marc Spindelman, Tyrone Garner’s Lawrence 
v. Texas, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (2013). 
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and its politics through imperial and imperious acts of judicial will that have forced 
lesbian and gay rights—including a right to same-sex marriage—on an American 
people that had not democratically supported them.83 
Notably, Obergefell’s slim, one-vote margin of decision and its anti-originalist 
methodology placed it and the rights it protects—and in a way, potentially, all the 
cases it built on—squarely in the cross-hairs of a majority of the Supreme Court that, 
even as Masterpiece Cakeshop was being decided, was on the precipice of a 
conservative lurch away from the centering Justice Kennedy had provided since 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s retirement (and sometimes before).84 Against this, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s approval of Obergefell and the Court’s earlier pro-lesbian-
and-gay rights jurisprudence by extension have the look and feel of an institutional 
commitment that entails an important compromise. Justices who dissented from 
Obergefell (or who might have been expected to had they been on the Court when it 
was decided) have now signaled, by joining Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop 
opinion and by staying their hands in separate opinions filed in the case, where they 
might have reserved judgment on the prospect of revisiting the Court’s lesbian and 
gay rights jurisprudence, that this body of constitutional law has garnered the entire 
Court’s authoritative respect. Whatever concerns existed about Obergefell’s ongoing 
authority after the 2016 presidential elections, Masterpiece Cakeshop gives reasons 
for thinking they may be, at least somewhat, put to rest. The entire Court—save Justice 
Kavanaugh, Justice Kennedy’s replacement, who may have his own reasons to honor 
Justice Kennedy’s lesbian and gay rights legacy jurisprudence—has now openly 
joined an opinion that figures Obergefell and its understanding of the right to marry 
as settled constitutional law. What’s more, this perspective is powerfully endorsed by 
an opinion that prominently highlights the significance of official silences in the face 
of spoken words as being constitutionally dispositive.85 
 
83  The Obergefell dissents are critically engaged along these lines in Marc Spindelman, 
Obergefell’s Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039 (2016) [hereinafter, Spindelman, Obergefell’s 
Dreams], but both Chief Justice John Roberts’ dissent, and, more vividly on the surface of the 
text, Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent make the relevant points. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612, 2621, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing Obergefell’s 
anti-democratic and extra-constitutional grounding); id. at 2626, 2627, 2629–31 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
84  Recognizing that Obergefell is anti-originalist as to method and outcome, as the Obergefell 
dissents point out, on which, see generally Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, supra note 83, 
the majority opinion in the case does not give up the cause of linking the reasons for its holding 
to history, including constitutional history. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2593–94 (2015) (noting “transcendent importance of marriage” in “the annals of human 
history,” commenting on its transformative powers “[s]ince the dawn of history,” and 
recognizing how the claims are part of an understanding of history as living); id. at 2595 
(observing that marriage’s history “is one of both continuity and change”); id. at 2598 
(commenting that the Founders “did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its 
dimensions, and so . . . entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons 
to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning”); id. at 2598–602 (reasoning from the constitutional 
protections accorded to cross-sex marriage that same-sex marriages are just like it in terms of 
marriage’s basic attributes).  
85  See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.  
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However superficially uninteresting Masterpiece Cakeshop’s adherence to 
principles of stare decisis may seem, the controversial nature of the Supreme Court’s 
lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence and Masterpiece Cakeshop’s endorsement of it is 
nevertheless a major achievement. Nothing in Masterpiece Cakeshop prevents the 
winds of uncertainty about the future of the Court’s lesbian and gay rights 
jurisprudence, including Obergefell, to begin to turn again, particularly if the Supreme 
Court begins to cut back on individual rights decisions in the closely doctrinally 
related area of reproductive rights. But in a ruling that technically did not require it, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s assurances that the Supreme Court jurisprudence of lesbian 
and gay rights, including Obergefell, is sound, is part of the law of the case that must 
not be missed or ignored. The constitutional rights of those inside the LGBT 
communities—including the right to marry—remain rights of equal dignity, respect, 
and first-class citizenship rank. So teaches Masterpiece Cakeshop. 
And that’s hardly all that Masterpiece Cakeshop offers to lesbians and gay men. 
Related to the way it secures the existing constitutional infrastructure of lesbian and 
gay rights, Masterpiece Cakeshop makes clear that the Court remains constitutionally 
committed to the basic structures of existing anti-discrimination laws.86 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s express insistence that it is not weighing in on the 
“difficult” question of how to settle the deep clash of civic equality and religious or 
moral values notwithstanding, the opinion describes the longstanding practice of 
translating constitutional equality norms into positive law, anti-discrimination rules as 
constitutionally “unexceptional”—even in the face of First Amendment religious 
liberty challenges to it.87 Indeed, Masterpiece Cakeshop returns to this theme over and 
 
86  A more emphatic articulation of the point, which reaches the conclusion in its own way, is 
in NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, supra note 2, at 203: “Masterpiece Cakeshop is not a narrow opinion that avoids 
fundamental questions about the relationship between antidiscrimination law and religious 
liberty; rather, the opinion offers a resounding answer to a full-bore challenge to public 
accommodations law.” 
87  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 1728. The same holds true in the face of First 
Amendment speech-based challenges on behalf of artistic freedom, on which see infra Part 
I.B.3. Recalling the double meaning of the “unexceptionality” of these anti-discrimination rules, 
their non-extraordinariness might render them either safeguarded against or distinctively 
vulnerable to constitutional challenge, on the thought that there’s nothing unusually special 
about them. Noting this vulnerability may be prophetic, though the text of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop reads as seeking to stabilize, not undermine, the protections against discrimination 
that anti-discrimination laws provide lesbians and gay men. See, e.g., id. at 1728 (“It is 
unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of 
individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and 
conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”). Accord NeJaime & Siegel, Religious 
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 2, at 208 
(describing the Court’s opinion as “treat[ing] lesbian and gay individuals as full members of the 
national community deserving of equal protection from discrimination,” and noting that “[t]he 
Court accomplishes this by analyzing the case as presenting an ordinary question of public 
accommodations law”); Sager & Tebbe, supra note 66, at 174 (characterizing as “constitutional 
bedrock” Masterpiece Cakeshop’s observation that “it is a general rule that [religious and 
philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in 
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over again, always more or less to the same basic effect, as the deep logic of the 
opinion itself suggests. Just as religious and moral views and values must not interfere 
with neutral and general constitutional rules of lesbian and gay equality—including in 
the marriage setting—and just as the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause provides 
no religious freedom exceptions to those constitutional obligations, so, too, in the 
context of anti-discrimination norms: Legislative commitments to the first-class 
citizenship status of lesbians and gay men and their rights to equal dignity and respect, 
as expressed in positive law rules of neutral and general applicability, hold against 
First Amendment religious freedom challenges to them. 
An initial sense of this perspective emerges even as Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
found saying, early on, it won’t be engaging the “difficult” questions involving the 
deep clashes of public values around equality and religious liberties the case entails. 
As it says this, the opinion goes out of its way to highlight the “difficulties” it believes 
would attend announcing a valid religious freedom claim as a defense to the ordinary 
operations of a public accommodations/anti-discrimination regime like Colorado’s. 
The permutations of First Amendment free exercise claims in this setting, the Court 
explains, “seem all but endless.”88 Endless they might be, were the Court ever to 
recognize that a right to religious freedom conditions, hence limits, the exercise of 
neutral and generally applicable anti-discrimination protections under law. But the 
problem the Court is identifying at this juncture goes beyond its implicit configuration 
of a problem of judicially manageable (or unmanageable) standards in the face of the 
possibility of readily proliferating religious liberty claims. Those constitutional 
challenges must be set against the highly serviceable and simple rule of regularity that 
has governed in this arena, and generally, for some time. As the Court characterizes 
the normal constitutional rule: “The Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in 
his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to the 
free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws.”89 
This use of “might”90—the baker “might have his right to the free exercise of 
religion limited by generally applicable laws”91—may initially sound like a hedge on 
what “the Court’s precedents [otherwise] make clear[.]”92 Viewed this way, it is 
interesting that the Court declines at this precise textual moment to cite the most 
obvious and relevant precedent for its point, Employment Division, Department of 
 
society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and 
generally applicable public accommodations law” (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1727)). 
88  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
89  Id. at 1723–24. 
90  Id. at 1724. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. at 1723. 
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Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith93 or any other decision announcing the 
constitutional rule that “[t]he Court’s precedents make clear.”94  
One possible explanation for this elision arrives in Justice Neil Gorsuch’s separate 
concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch’s opinion emphasizes the controversy that Smith 
has engendered “in many quarters”95 as a prelude to its own careful description of 
Smith’s scope. As the concurrence puts it, providing an opening for just the sort of 
exception Masterpiece Cakeshop potentially involved, “this Court held that a neutral 
and generally applicable law will usually survive a constitutional free exercise 
challenge.”96  
Looking at the Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion in light of Justice Gorsuch’s 
concurrence, it could be that the majority opinion’s studious avoidance of Smith and 
the family of cases associated with it is an element of what Walter Murphy felicitously 
dubbed “judicial strategy.”97 It could be part of an underlying project that responds to 
sensitivities that Justice Gorsuch’s separate opinion or one or more of the other justices 
making up the Court’s majority expressed, a vote-getting or vote-holding move. 
Another understanding of the majority opinion’s elision of Smith and the 
precedents to which it’s related is also in sight. When Masterpiece Cakeshop observes 
that Phillips-the-baker “might”98 have his religious freedom rights curtailed by the 
state through its anti-discrimination laws, it may well be doing nothing more than 
characterizing Smith’s rule while carefully noting that it operates in part by giving the 
state a constitutional permission about how it legislates against discrimination.  
Consistent with Smith, the state must not purposefully discriminate against religion 
when enacting neutral anti-discrimination rules of general applicability. But those 
laws “might” nevertheless contain within them safe harbors for the free exercise of 
 
93  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith is cited by 
the majority opinion in its description of the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling in the case. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. It is also cited in the Court’s description of 
proceedings in the Colorado Court of Appeals. Id. at 1727. 
94  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
95  Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
96  Id. (emphasis added). 
97  See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). Consider 
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (mem.) (Alito, J., concurring in 
the denial of certiorari) (discussing Smith as having “drastically cut back on the protection 
provided by the Free Exercise Clause”). See also Linda Greenhouse, The Court and the Cross, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/opinion/supreme-court-
religion-first-amendment.html (“The court’s most conservative justices — Samuel Alito, 
Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh — are currently trolling for a case that 
would provide a vehicle for reinterpreting the Free Exercise Clause to give the same robust 
protection for believers as the statute [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act], in the court’s 
view, currently does. Achieving that goal means overturning a 1990 precedent, Employment 
Division v. Smith[.]”). See also, e.g., Laycock, Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
supra note 2, at 201 (“Some religious conservatives look forward to Smith being overruled. That 
could happen; four Justices recently invited litigants to explicitly present the question.”). 
98  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24. 
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religion, which function to limit the anti-discrimination rubric’s ordinary sweep.99 The 
Court here, then, may simply be expressing the obvious: that states might, as Colorado 
did, enact neutral and general public accommodations rules that govern all businesses 
serving the public without exception. Business owners like Phillips, whose faith might 
counsel action that would violate public accommodations rules, might in those 
circumstances be required to abide by the neutral and general rules which regulate 
them “in [their] capacit[ies] as the owner[s] of . . . business[es] serving the public.”100 
In the alternative, the states “might” instead choose to carve out exceptions in their 
public accommodations statutes for religious or moral views and values, enabling 
those who sincerely adhere to them, say, to have a valid defense against what would 
otherwise be a claim or liability for unlawful discrimination. Seen this way, the 
Court’s opinion is a simple and straightforward invocation and endorsement of Smith 
and its teaching. 
Although this may sound strange, both possibilities may be right in this instance. 
It might both be significant and not significant at all that Masterpiece Cakeshop avoids 
invoking Smith and the cases related to it by name at this moment when the Court 
could obviously lean on their authority. That it doesn’t flags the enduringly significant 
issue of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s meaning in relation to Smith. On this score, there’s 
much more to Masterpiece Cakeshop than its invocation (not citation) of Smith’s rule 
as both “clear” and well-settled law. 
Among the more potent facts in evidence in Masterpiece Cakeshop is the way the 
opinion builds on and reinforces Smith’s basic structure, and in particular, Smith’s 
view that the state may regulate religious and moral practices along with their secular 
counterparts without running afoul of the First Amendment—so long as it produces 
and adheres to neutral rules of general applicability that don’t purposefully 
discriminate against religious and moral conduct, or religious or moral actors, because 
of their religious or moral views and values.  
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s basic alignment with this understanding of Smith is easily 
obscured by the Court’s own representation of its decision in the case, amplified by 
those who see it as a narrow, shallow, and modest decision, involving only what is 
sometimes regarded as an exception to Smith’s rule: a stand-alone anti-religious 
discrimination claim against the state of Colorado.101 The opinion’s idea here is that 
 
99  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010) (“CLS . . . seeks not parity 
with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings’ policy. The First 
Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity, 
however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state 
subvention of its selectivity.”); id. at 694 n.24 (“The question here, however, is not whether 
Hastings could, consistent with the Constitution, provide religious groups dispensation from the 
all-comers policy by permitting them to restrict membership to those who share their faith. It is 
instead whether Hastings must grant that exemption.”). 
100  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24. 
101  See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993). 
Lukumi is cited in the majority opinion, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730, 1731, 
including for the important proposition “that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s 
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of 
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Colorado breached its constitutional obligation to avoid religious discrimination when 
its agents, during the course of enforcement proceedings involving what happens to 
have been the state’s public accommodations laws, revealed their anti-religious bias 
while in different ways also remaining inappropriately silent in the face of it.  
What this account of Masterpiece Cakeshop achieves in simplicity it loses in its 
capacity to explain how Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms and extends the promises of 
Smith and its rules.  
The thinking here is not complex. Masterpiece Cakeshop teaches that laws of 
general applicability must not only be neutral in the abstract and in their initial 
promulgation, but that they must steadfastly remain neutral throughout the course of 
their actual operations. When they do not, when they “even ‘subtl[y] depart[] from 
neutrality’ on matters of religion”102—as the record in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
indicates to the Court is what took place in this case—the state will be held to have 
violated its “obligation of religious neutrality”103 under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
This shift in perspective here is conceptually small, but significant in terms of its 
implications. Seen this way, Masterpiece Cakeshop is not merely about the 
constitutional wrongfulness of statements and silences amounting to state 
discrimination against a person of faith, much as that is involved in the case. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is an object lesson about both the constitutional wrongfulness 
and the constitutional propriety of state laws written consistent with Smith and how 
those laws function in action. Masterpiece Cakeshop is very strict with the state in 
order to exact compliance with the constitutional guarantee of state neutrality with 
respect to religion under Smith. When the state truly remains neutral the ways that 
Smith and now Masterpiece Cakeshop instruct that it must, it may continue to bar 
discrimination in public accommodations through a unitary and general rule of 
conduct that governs “business[es] serving the public”—even when they’re owned 
and operated by people of deep religious faith or by traditional moralists of a different 
stripe.104 Masterpiece Cakeshop hammers the state proceedings in the case in a way 
that effectively defends the ongoing constitutional tenability of anti-discrimination 
regimes like Colorado’s that regulate, while seeking to guarantee, broad equal access 
to public accommodations on various non-discrimination grounds. 
While this is partly an argument from—and of—interpretive atmospherics, 
passages emerge at various points in Masterpiece Cakeshop that condense and 
sediment the understanding.105 In one important passage, for instance, in which the 
 
affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the 
illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.” Id. at 1731. The opinion then clarifies that “even 
‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of religion” are “bar[red],” id., continuing by 
explaining that, “[h]ere, this means that the Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise 
Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.” Id. 
102  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
103  Id. at 1723. 
104  See id. at 1724, 1727–29. 
105  See, for instance, supra text accompanying note 98. 
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Court’s text is working overtime to keep up the appearance of solidarity with both of 
the ways of life it understands to be warring in the case, the Court remarks that “[i]t is 
unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other 
classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the 
same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”106 This is 
the Court speaking plainly to what it regards as the Constitution’s, hence the positive 
law’s, “normal science”: Positive law civil rights protections are part and parcel of our 
shared political life and in accord with its deepest values.107 So long as these rules 
satisfy conditions of religious neutrality, they are not subject to constitutional doubt. 
“Unexceptional” means just that. Here the Court illustrates the difficulty that religious 
liberty arguments recommending constitutional limits on what is otherwise 
unexceptional will and should face in the courts. So far, Smith and anti-discrimination 
rules enacted and enforced consistent with it, hold.  
Leading arguments for Phillips’s position in Masterpiece Cakeshop affirmed 
without calling into question the authority of these basic constitutional and positive 
law conventions, treating them as axiomatic in our constitutional regime. Thus did 
supporters of Phillips’s position have to try to thread what they sought to describe as 
a very small eye of a very sharp needle, mounting religious liberty claims that would 
not blow a big constitutional hole through public accommodations rules like 
Colorado’s. Consistent with this thinking were ideas in the case about how public 
accommodations rules might apply to the off-the-shelf baked goods that religious 
bakers made, but not to those goods that were custom-made for events like 
weddings.108 Only the custom-made items, not “premade baked items,” were to be 
given First Amendment religious liberty protections.109   
This purportedly circumscribed religious liberty claim even in this purportedly 
circumscribed form involved a roll-back of Smith’s authorization of state action 
 
106  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
107  On “normal science,” see Kathryn Abrams, Introduction, The Distinctive Energies of 
“Normal Science,” 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 5 (2011) (citing Angela P. Harris, What 
Ever Happened to Feminist Legal Theory?, 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 12 (2011), which 
itself draws the metaphor from THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1962)). 
108  Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726 (“The investigation found that 
Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples on this 
basis. The investigator also recounted that, according to affidavits submitted by Craig and 
Mullins, Phillips’ shop had refused to sell cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment 
celebration because the shop ‘had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for 
this type of event.’”), with Brief of Petitioners at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16–111) (“These limitations on Phillips’s custom work have no bearing on his 
premade baked items, which he sells to everyone, no questions asked.”), and with Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that “the Colorado Court of Appeals resolved [a] factual dispute [about “whether 
Phillips refused to create a custom wedding cake for the individual respondents, or whether he 
refused to sell them any wedding cake (including a premade one)”] in Phillips’ favor.”). 
109  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728; Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 9 
(“These limitations on Phillips’s custom work have no bearing on his premade baked items, 
which he sells to everyone, no questions asked.”).  
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regulating religious practice consistent with neutral rules of general applicability. 
Understanding this, Masterpiece Cakeshop shoots back against this position with 
respectful constitutional doubt. A “decision in favor of the baker”110 that created a 
new, constitutionally grounded religious freedom exception to the state’s public 
accommodations rules “would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors 
of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in 
effect be allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if they will 
be used for gay marriages,’ something that would impose a serious stigma on gay 
persons.”111  
The Court’s careful locution technically leaves open the prospect that a 
“sufficiently constrained” claim of just this sort might be proposed to and accepted by 
the Court in a future case. To succeed, the Court would have to perceive, as it did not 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, a meaningful constitutional offramp. Emphasizing the 
Court’s expressive care here risks missing the degree to which Masterpiece Cakeshop 
itself discounts the prospect of the Court finding, then affirming, such a “sufficiently 
constrained” argument. The Court, after all, had before it the best and most 
“constrained” arguments that supporters of religious liberty, representing Jack Phillips 
and Masterpiece Cakeshop, could come up with. Faced with those arguments, 
constructed by some of the cultural conservative movement’s best and brightest 
lawyers, the Court was not moved to accept them. Presumably, the Court knew what 
it would be committing itself to doing if it did so. It would have been starting itself 
down a path that would immediately commit it to limiting Smith, hence undermining 
its foundations, potentially paving the way of its overruling, while also—this is 
important in light of what Masterpiece Cakeshop says—authorizing a return to an 
open season of public discrimination against gay marriage that, in the Court’s words, 
“would impose a serious stigma on [lesbian and] gay persons.”112  
In the age of Obergefell—which Masterpiece Cakeshop preserves, hence 
continues—First Amendment religious freedom ought not be understood to include a 
constitutional right to practice anti-lesbian and anti-gay discrimination that the 
Constitution forbids the state to impose. Just as lesbians and gay men, married and 
not, are themselves constitutionally guaranteed freedom from state discrimination in 
a range of aspects of state-regulated life, they may also be granted, hence enjoy, broad 
and basic anti-discrimination protections that shore up their constitutional equality, 
dignity, and liberty rights—free from judicial interference in the name recognizing 
and vindicating First Amendment rights to religious or moral free exercise.113 
All this in Masterpiece Cakeshop is a function not only of the Court’s own general 
understandings of the relationship between legal and constitutional equality and 
religious freedom  norms, but also, more particularly, as a function of the meaning and 
implication of the Supreme Court’s lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, a body of 
law that, much to the bitter disappointment of some faithful conservatives and 
 
110  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
111  Id. at 1728–29. 
112  Id. at 1729. 
113  But see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643, 659 (2000). This makes Dale an 
outlier. 
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traditional moralists, has effectively blocked the operation of religious and moral 
views and values in the political, hence the legal, realm, where they long supported 
laws and legal rules that actively discriminated against and stigmatized lesbians and 
gay men. In vital respects that Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms, the Supreme Court’s 
lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, including Obergefell, has, after all, announced a 
highly politically liberal view of the state’s normative relation to lesbian and gay rights 
and lesbians and gay men. Nothing may stop religious or moral views on the status of 
homosexuality from being expressed in the public arena, but those views, however 
else they circulate, cannot become the basis for anti-lesbian and anti-gay state 
regulation. It is partly with views like these in mind that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
proposes that: “Our society” (and not just the Court) “has come to” recognize that 
rules of law, including those that are religiously or morally driven, that would treat 
“gay persons and gay couples . . . as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth” 
impinge upon the freedoms lesbians and gay persons must be allowed “in the exercise 
of their civil rights.”114 Courts and other governmental actors are duty-bound to give 
the civil rights and freedoms lesbians and gay men are entitled to both “great weight 
and respect,” respect that isn’t cross-cut or diminished by constitutional respect for 
religious views and moral values.115 
This being the deeply liberal structure of the Court’s lesbian and gay rights 
jurisprudence, now reaffirmed by Masterpiece Cakeshop, it stands to reason that this 
constitutional rights framework would find structurally analogous expression in the 
positive-law anti-discrimination setting. As the Court notes, the state is authorized to 
regulate private actors in ways that conform to the constitutional rules of civil society 
that the state itself must abide. By extension, just as constitutional norms of lesbian 
and gay equality rights—rights the Court has given expression in both neutral and 
generally applicable ways—are not subject to an override by the state in the name of 
religion or of morality, those claims having no constitutional force against lesbian and 
gay rights in the political realm, there is likewise to be no constitutionally based 
religious freedom exception that would cut short the operation of positive law anti-
discrimination rules for reasons of faith or morality. This understanding of what 
Masterpiece Cakeshop proposes exfoliates the Court’s position that positive law anti-
discrimination rules, including when they bar anti-gay discrimination by private 
actors, are “unexceptional” and remain “unexceptional” when applied to, hence 
regulate, faithful and moral action on the same terms applied to all other forms of 
public conduct. Nor, one might think, could it be otherwise, if the structure of 
constitutional governance rules is effectively to ensure lesbians and gay men get the 
equal dignity and worth, first-class citizenship rights, and individual liberty they 
deserve.  
To repeat, this does not mean that people acting from their faith-based or moral 
commitments who stand opposed to homosexuality and to same-sex intimacies and 
relationships may not hold to their views and express them in the public arena. 
Obergefell expressly confirms that right and nothing in Masterpiece Cakeshop takes 
 
114  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
115  Id. 
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it away.116 But expression is one thing and translation of that expression into 
discriminatory action is another. So, as faithful conservatives and traditional moralists 
have no First Amendment religious right to translate their opposition to homosexuality 
into policy that would serve to govern, so, too, they may not govern lesbians and gay 
men through their interpersonal and public conduct in those jurisdictions that, like 
Colorado, have legally constrained it. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause is 
in this respect not a source of a political right: No right to translate religious or 
traditional moral views and values against homosexuality into law and no right to 
translate them into a legal exception to the operation of neutral and generally 
applicable anti-discrimination laws that conform to the demands of Smith. Though 
deeply politically liberal in its orientation, this approach to the rights of the faithful 
and of traditional moralists is no warrant to discriminate against them in the 
enforcement of existing anti-discrimination rules. And while some very particular and 
very limited constitutional incursions on the rights of lesbians and gay men may be 
tolerated in order to protect the rights of the faithful and of traditional moralists—more 
about which momentarily—the general pattern set that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
confirms, broadly but not rigidly and not without exception to balance it out, is deeply 
pro-lesbian-and-gay.  
Recognizing that Masterpiece Cakeshop does not finally settle these matters in all 
their particulars, indeed, acknowledging that the opinion formally leaves open the 
narrow question of whether there might be some “sufficiently constrained” Free 
Exercise right that may yet be articulated that will not cut too deeply into the regular 
operation of public accommodations and other anti-discrimination laws, the Court’s 
opinion in the case insists on the basic security of both constitutional and positive law 
anti-discrimination claims that lesbians and gay men enjoy, if not as commonly as 
many would like.117 Consistent with Masterpiece Cakeshop, no argument will prevail 
against these claims of right that does not preserve them in their basic and broad 
operation, lest the Court begin to unwind its lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, 
allowing private actors acting for religious or moral reasons to stigmatize lesbians and 
gay men by excluding them from ordinary aspects of public life. From this starting 
point, it would be easy to imagine other politically based, anti-gay attacks being 
defended in the name of religious freedom from the Court’s own constitutionally 
grounded anti-discrimination rules. Masterpiece Cakeshop promises the Court won’t 
walk this path. 
 
116  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The First Amendment ensures 
that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the 
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep 
aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those 
who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex 
marriage is proper or indeed essential . . . may engage those who disagree with their view in an 
open and searching debate.”). 
117  For some of these limits, consider Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Whether 
Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay and Transgender Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2019, at A1. See infra note 210. 
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2. The Pro-Faith and Pro-Traditional-Morality Rulings 
All that is what lesbians and gay men—and others concerned with civil rights, civil 
liberties, and civil justice—receive. What about faithful conservatives and traditional 
moralists? What does Masterpiece Cakeshop give them?  
In general terms, to return to Masterpiece Cakeshop’s central holding, the Court’s 
opinion promises that constitutionally unexceptional public accommodations and anti-
discrimination regimes like Colorado’s will be meaningfully neutral both on their face 
and in operation. These regimes must not come at the expense of faithful conservatives 
or traditional moralists and their own constitutional entitlements to equal dignity, 
respect, and full membership in political community. Masterpiece Cakeshop 
announces that the Supreme Court is now on watch in a renewed, activated way over 
the vast operations of the legal system, prepared to protect faithful conservatives and 
traditional moralists from the vicissitudes of state discrimination against them because 
of their religious and moral views, values, and beliefs. Liberal secular views and 
sensitivities, which may in certain respects themselves be constitutionally required, 
must not blunt the state’s and its agents’ capacities for understanding and treating 
conservative religionists and traditional moralists with equal concern and respect—
even, or perhaps especially, when they are charged with violating anti-discrimination 
rules. But these promises, which include the elevation of a conservative religious and 
moralistic perspective to the level of a constitutional norm that constrains the 
deployment of state power, are not the only promises that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
makes to them. 
Perhaps most significantly, over and above the central ruling in the case, is how 
Masterpiece Cakeshop concretely delivers a First Amendment Free Exercise ruling on 
the rights of clergy to practice their faith when serving as civil marriage officiants. 
The articulation of this rule—part of a long-assumed axiom of First Amendment 
religious liberty—marks an important outer limit of the Supreme Court’s pro-lesbian-
and-gay jurisprudence,118 and one that also potentially supplies a foothold against it 
for any future attempt seeking to claw back pro-lesbian-and-gay constitutional gains. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s declaration about the rights of clergy serving as civil 
marriage officiants arrives against the backdrop of Obergefell. Although Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell went out of its way to insist that its right-
to-marry ruling was no knock against religion, a number of its readers, building on the 
Obergefell dissents, saw it as a deeply politically liberal decision the secular liberal 
impulses of which were insensitive, indeed hostile, to religion and traditional 
morality.119 At the sharpest edges of these concerns was the prospect that Obergefell’s 
 
118  See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Douglas Laycock et al. in Support of Petitioners at 30, 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) [hereinafter Laycock, 
Obergefell Brief] (indicating that the “broader principle” on which Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), “rests” “plainly covers [a] 
religious body’s definition of marriage and its willingness or unwillingness to solemnize or 
celebrate a marriage, or provide the space for doing so.”). 
119  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2607 (making the point that the opinion intends respect 
for religious views and values). For perceptions of Obergefell’s actual insensitivity and hostility 
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“transformation” of civil marriage, “a keystone” of the social order, might fully 
secularize it, and, in the process, diminish or eliminate the clergy’s rights to be 
involved with it on faithful terms.120 
     Alarmist as they may sound, these concerns are within Obergefell’s doctrinal 
reach in ways that Justice Antonin Scalia anticipated during oral arguments in the 
case.121 Obergefell’s central holding, constitutionally prohibiting the state from 
differentiating between same-sex and cross-sex couples for civil marriage purposes, 
technically operates by limiting the state’s authority over civil marriage through cases 
brought against various state agents. That Obergefell’s limits on the state’s authority 
over civil marriage apply equally to state and state agents alike was dramatically 
reinforced after the decision came down when various state actors from different 
jurisdictions, objecting to the ruling, sought to evade its strictures on religious and/or 
moral grounds.122 The official decisions variously requiring those agents to submit to 
Obergefell’s authority spotlighted a prospect that could independently be perceived: 
that clergy who receive their legal authority to consecrate civil marriage from the state, 
 
to religion and traditional morality expressed by the Obergefell dissents, see, for example, id. 
at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing some of the “serious questions about religious 
liberty” the majority opinion raises, and observing that “[t]he First Amendment guarantees . . . 
the freedom to ‘exercise’ religion. Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.”); id. at 
2638–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Obergefell’s threats to religious liberty); id. at 2642 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting Obergefell will “be used to vilify Americans who are 
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy” and leveraged to “stamp out every vestige of dissent,” 
except perhaps “whisper[ing] their thoughts in the recesses of their homes”). An impassioned 
sense of the secular, anti-religious stakes of Obergefell, traceable to the goals of the 
“homosexual rights advocates” behind it, is found in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Wreckage of 
Obergefell, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2015, at 33, 36 (“If same-sex marriage is, as the Court has now 
said, a fundamental constitutional liberty, those who resist it are like segregationists resisting 
Brown v. Board of Education—forces of evil to be extirpated. Civil rights laws provide the 
bulldozer for eliminating such views. . . . The[] goal of [“[h]omosexual rights advocates”] is to 
stigmatize, delegitimize, and quickly extinguish opposition to the new norm, especially dissent 
grounded in religious conviction. They avowedly seek to run traditional religious views off the 
field.”). 
120  The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (“These and other 
developments in the institution of marriage over the past centuries . . . worked deep 
transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as 
essential.”); id. at 2590 (“[M]arriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order.”). 
121  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556).  
122  See, e.g., BILLY CORRIHER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A HANDFUL OF ELECTED STATE 
JUDGES CONTINUE TO DENY MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/30105912/JudgesMarriageDefiance-brief2.pdf; The Editorial Board, 
Illegal Defiance on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/opinion/illegal-defiance-on-same-sex-marriage.html 
(collecting a few examples). 
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might, as state agents in this limited respect, be similarly compelled to recognize that 
Obergefell was their “Ruler,” too.123  
Prominent among the forms of resistance to these prospects were state law reform 
efforts expressly authorizing clergy generally licensed by state law to perform civil 
marriages to refuse to do so in cases of same-sex marriage.124 One problem with these 
measures was how they flouted what many understood to be Obergefell’s command. 
Problematically, they imagined the state retained the authority even after Obergefell 
to license (at least some of) its agents to do what it itself could not: discriminate for 
religious and/or moral reasons between same-sex and cross-sex couples who wished 
to marry.125  
Against the prospects of the unconstitutionality of these measures, which 
underlined the case for Obergefell’s threat to the rights of clergy acting as civil 
marriage officiants, many remained certain that nothing in Obergefell generated any 
actual instability around the free exercise rights of clergy to refuse to perform civil 
marriages in contravention of their faith. Those who saw matters this way found 
support in the comprehensive responses offered to Justice Scalia’s concerns at the time 
he expressed them. After he first raised a question at oral arguments about ministerial 
rights to refuse participation in same-sex marriages, Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena 
Kagan joined cause to remind him and those who shared his concerns that the clergy 
had in fact long been understood to enjoy a First Amendment free exercise right not 
to celebrate marriages for couples of different faiths.126 That being the case, their 
remarks suggested, any decision in Obergefell affirming the right to marry for same-
sex couples would surely not operate to restrict clergy rights to decide whether to 
solemnize those marriages. When Justice Scalia even more pointedly asked, “You 
agree that – that ministers will not have to conduct same-sex marriages?,” Mary 
Bonauto, for the petitioners, responded unhesitatingly and unequivocally: “If they do 
not want to, that is correct. I believe that is affirmed under the First Amendment.”127 
 
123  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decree says that my 
Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers 
on the Supreme Court.”). 
124  See, e.g., H.B. 1706, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016); H.B. 36, 132d Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017). Perspective on religious accommodations measures in 
antidiscrimination statutes is found, among other works, in Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, 
Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 
619 (2015) [hereinafter, Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and 
Antidiscrimination Law], and Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: 
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015). 
125  A version of this argument is in Testimony Regarding H.B. 36 Before the H.                     
Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.                                           
(Ohio 2017) (statement of Prof. Marc Spindelman),                                                                                            
https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/02/Spindelman-IP-
testimony-H.B.36.pdf. 
126  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556) 
(comments by Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan). 
127  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556) (question 
by Justice Scalia and answer by Mary Bonauto). 
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Bonauto cited no Supreme Court authority for this “belief,” but that was because there 
was none at hand to cite for the point. The First Amendment free exercise rule she 
invoked was so axiomatic that no Supreme Court case had ever had to declare and set 
its boundaries.128 Just the same, Bonauto’s view, which Chief Justice Roberts 
curiously characterized as a litigation “concession,” as though there might still be 
some doubt about it, expressed a clear, if not the only, vision of the constitutional 
landscape that Obergefell took as background when it was decided.129 Seen this way, 
Obergefell’s silence on the rights of clergy to refuse to perform same-sex marriages 
was predictable but in an entirely uninteresting sense. It meant nothing and did nothing 
to call the pre-existing rights of clergy into doubt. All the Sturm und Drang about 
Obergefell’s implications for the clergy’s constitutional freedom was a distraction 
that, viewed critically, was either a political strategy to whip up a base in opposition 
to Obergefell, a wildly irrational reading of the decision, or, maybe, both. 
What these critical registers achieve from a certain point of view they achieve by 
not acknowledging, and even evading, how Obergefell, as its dissents attested, 
conduced to a phenomenology of upheaval, groundlessness, and doubt. As the dissents 
maintained, Obergefell’s decision to “order[] the transformation of a social institution 
that ha[d] formed the basis of human society for millennia” did not have the look and 
feel of a measured constitutional ruling that took the next logical step in the course of 
the Supreme Court’s evolving lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence.130 Instead, it 
appeared to involve the production of what the dissents saw as a radical, 
unprecedented, revolutionary rupture that, as an act of pure judicial will, broke faith 
with the past, raising the wonder Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent expressed: “If an 
unvarying social institution enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit 
judicial policymaking, what can?”131 This ruling, in which the Supreme Court 
arrogated to itself the power to be the nation’s and the nation’s people’s “Ruler,” not 
only banished conservative religious views and traditional moral values from their 
place within the public square, where their traditional understanding of marriage as 
the union of one man to one woman as husband and wife could hold sway in law, but 
it also threatened to closet them so that they might only speak their “old beliefs” in 
“whispers,” as Justice Alito’s dissent put it, “in the recesses of their homes[.]”132 In 
these and other ways, the Obergefell dissents depicted Obergefell as revolutionary in 
the sense of turning the world upside down in a grand act of theft—“[s]tealing this 
 
128  Consider the precise locution of the remarks found in the amicus brief Douglas Laycock 
filed in Obergefell, Laycock, Obergefell Brief, supra note 118 at 30 (indicating that “broader 
principle” on which Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171 (2012), “rests” “plainly covers [a] religious body’s definition of marriage and its 
willingness or unwillingness to solemnize or celebrate a marriage, or provide the space for doing 
so.”). 
129  Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556) (“We have 
a concession from your friend that clergy will not be required to perform same-sex 
marriage[.]”). 
130  The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
131  Id. at 2622. 
132  The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Ruler”), and id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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issue from the people”—in ways that meant that all bets were off on what the Supreme 
Court would or wouldn’t or could or couldn’t possibly do next.133 This was not a 
Supreme Court that could be counted on to recognize the histories and traditions of 
the American people, including people of faith, as constitutional ballast. So, yes, 
Obergefell’s silence around the constitutional rights of clergy to refuse to involve 
themselves in same-sex civil marriages might be meaningless. It might precisely signal 
Obergefell left them untouched and intact. But the silence could also be a wink to 
“homosexual rights advocates” who proffered a litigation concession recognizing the 
constitutional rights of clergy while harboring dreams of “stigmatiz[ing], 
delegitimiz[ing], and quickly extinguish[ing] opposition to the new [pro-homosexual] 
norm [that Obergefell announced], especially dissent [to it] grounded in religious 
conviction,” all in the hopes of “avowedly seek[ing] to run traditional religious views 
off the field.”134 If the traditional definition of marriage didn’t stop the Obergefell 
Court from doing what it did, why would an axiom about the free exercise rights of 
the clergy in relation to traditional marriage fare any better? If Obergefell did not 
intend to sow doubts around the rights of clergy after Justice Scalia brought them up, 
it could very easily have followed the lead of some earlier same-sex marriage rulings 
that pretermitted worries like these with only a few, direct words.135 Recognizing its 
choice not to utter them, Obergefell left open the possibility that its silence on the 
clergy’s rights—whatever the Court’s original intention behind it—could later be 
filled up with anti-religious content that would have the practical effect of compelling 
clergy to perform civil marriages they did not wish to, or of practically pushing them 
out of the civil marriage business altogether. Hence the phenomenology that 
Obergefell produced for some: of upheaval, groundlessness, and doubt.  
     Masterpiece Cakeshop firmly and finally puts these possibilities—however 
remote or imminent they once were—to rest.136 Without being required to, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop clarifies retrospectively that Obergefell implied no 
abandonment of constitutional respect for our country’s longstanding commitment to 
 
133  The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
134 Paulsen, supra note 119, at 36. Many will have trouble recognizing Paulsen’s “homosexual 
rights advocates” and their views, particularly those lesbians and gay men who have deeply 
faithful commitments and the many others who themselves do not but who nevertheless are 
deeply dedicated to ensuring that faithful commitments and those who hold them get their full 
constitutional respects. Cf., e.g., CHRISTIAN DE LA HUERTA, COMING OUT SPIRITUALLY: THE 
NEXT STEP (1999). 
135  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008) (“no religious officiant will 
be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs”); Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.29 (Mass. 2003) (observing that “[o]ur decision 
in no way limits the rights of individuals to refuse to marry persons of the same sex for religious 
or any other reasons”). 
136  On the inevitability, consider the positions mapped out in the Masterpiece Cakeshop 
litigation in Brief of Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-
111) (arguing that “under the reasoning of the court below, the state could even force an 
Orthodox rabbi to preside at a wedding of two men, or of a Jew and a non-Jew”), and the answer 
in Brief for the Central Conference of American Rabbis et al. as Amici Curiae at 22–23, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (explaining that there is “no basis” for 
concerns like this in light of Obergefell, with its references to religious liberty). 
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religious liberty, and specifically, no diminution or elimination of the clergy’s free 
exercise rights in relation to civil marriage. Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms 
Obergefell’s promise of the right to marry, but this time around as a promise that is 
subject to an important caveat for the free exercise rights of clergy acting under color 
of state law. They are told that they may continue to choose which civil marriages to 
perform—including same-sex, cross-sex, or both—consistent with their faith. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop licenses clergy to treat cross-sex and same-sex couples and 
marriages differently for religious and/or moral reasons, assuring them the 
constitutional right to do what the state from which their civil marriage authority 
derives must not do for itself. If and when the clergy exercise this right and 
discriminate against same-sex couples and same-sex marriages, their actions will not 
be chalked up to the state as unconstitutional state action under Obergefell.137 
Masterpiece Cakeshop structures this announcement in simple and direct, if 
situationally qualified, terms: 
When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the 
clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could 
not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his right to the 
free exercise of religion. This refusal would be well understood in our 
constitutional order as an exercise of religion, an exercise that gay persons 
could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own 
dignity and worth.138 
In saying this, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s constitutional assumption effectively 
recognizes what the Court regards as a reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
constitutional values. Past its awkward conditionals, the passage delivers present-tense 
declarations that readers are urged to accept as constitutional fact. “When it comes to 
[the] weddings” of same-sex couples, the right to marry is constitutionally protected, 
but “it can [still] be assumed” that religious officiants need not involve themselves in 
consecrating these civil marriages under state law.139 Members of the clergy who 
refuse to be involved in same-sex marriages cannot “be compelled” to do so without 
violating their “right[s] to the free exercise of religion.”140 In “our constitutional 
order,” these refusals are constitutionally safeguarded “exercise[s] of religion” that 
“gay persons could”—meaning, in context, will have to—“recognize and accept.”141 
Protecting the rights of clergy not to involve themselves in same-sex marriages does 
not violate lesbian women’s and gay men’s constitutional rights. For the Court 
certainly, if not for everyone else, this is a modest, reasonable constitutional 
adjustment that must be made consistent with the traditions of our pluralistic 
 
137  Important insights on state action doctrine works are in Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, 
State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
138  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
139 Id. Nothing in Masterpiece Cakeshop formally precludes states from de-conferring 
authority on the clergy to officiate civil marriages. It clarifies only that Obergefell’s 
constitutional rule on civil marriage “can be assumed” not to require them to use the civil 
marriage authority they receive from the state in contradiction of their faith. Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
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constitutional system and that should be acceptable to “gay persons” since there is no 
“serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth,” or their basic legal rights.142 
So far, Masterpiece Cakeshop has proven to be right: No serious resistance to these 
First Amendment restrictions on the constitutional right to marry has yet emerged. 
In making this announcement about the constitutional free exercise rights of the 
clergy not to officiate same-sex marriages that the state itself must recognize, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is, of course, once again weighing in on precisely the 
“difficult” terrain it indicates at the outset it is not going to decide. The Court does so 
in a way that suggests a certain symmetry is its guide. The Court is seeking to construct 
a neutral balance between the rights and respect accorded to the two “sides” involved 
in the deep clash of values the case implicates. Just as conservatives of faith “might 
have [their] right[s] to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable 
laws”143 when those laws operate in truly neutral ways, so lesbians, gay men, and 
same-sex couples “might have [their own constitutional] right[s]”144 diminished, albeit 
not in any “serious” way, in the face of a limited range of free exercise claims by 
clergy consistent with their “moral and religious” views and values.145 The Court is 
asking conservatives of faith and traditional moralists, along with “gay persons,” to 
“recognize and accept” these cross-party checks on their constitutional rights as part 
of what it means to live together in a pluralistic constitutional community.146 
While the Court’s articulation of this “assumption” about the rights of clergy to be 
state agents and still to use their state-conferred powers in ways that are consistent 
with their faith is technically only that, to imagine this is nonbinding dicta instead of 
a binding rule of law that lower courts should and will follow and that the Supreme 
Court in a future case would, too, is to give short shrift to the practical gravity of this 
declaration in a Supreme Court opinion such as this.147 Here is the Supreme Court 
making a constitutional commitment to clergy who lead communities of faith and 
moral values. There are no easy take-backs with a constitutional assumption like this 
one, about as solemn a constitutional promise as any the Supreme Court might make 
as a matter of secular constitutional faith. 
Herein lies a key point to understanding the authoritative status in law of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s other shadow rulings. Recognizing the cross-cutting balances 
animating the opinion and the ways it affirms the rights of those the Court sees on both 
sides of the controversy, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s various shadow rulings may be 
regarded as all having the same basic legal stature: not formal holdings, but something 
closer to that than to what the language of dicta would conventionally suggest. These 
are promises that emerge from the Constitution, that covenant Justice Kennedy 
famously understood to run from generation to generation of Americans, which the 
 
142  Id. 
143  Id. at 1724. 
144  Id.  
145  Id. at 1727. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. (noting that the relevant rights of the clergy “can be assumed”). 
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Court has repeatedly stood prepared to make good on, and, as Justice Kennedy put it 
elsewhere, whose meaning may become clearer as time and understandings change.148  
Seen in this light, and surveying all the legal ground that Justice Kennedy’s 
Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion claims and occupies and presumably is ready to 
defend, and even without forgetting all the aspects of the “difficult questions” the case 
presents that the Court does not in any way address, it is time to ask once more: Exactly 
how is this a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling? 
3. The First Amendment Speech Arguments for Artistic Freedom 
The overarching thrust of the argument to this point has been that Masterpiece 
Cakeshop is a wider, deeper, and less modest decision than it has regularly been 
understood to be. That argument is about to be extended, but first it needs to be 
acknowledged that the majority opinion in the case doesn’t claim as much ground as 
it might have. This isn’t intended as an observation on how the Court could have done 
more to fill out and rule on aspects of the case it does decide. It is, rather, a way of 
focusing attention on the Court’s treatment of the other First Amendment claims 
presented in the case: claims that variously circled around the notion that Phillips is a 
custom cake artist whose artistry, which is in service of his faith, enjoys First 
Amendment speech protections that guarantee him the artistic freedom to decide 
whether or not to use his talents to create custom-made cake commissions for same-
sex marriage celebrations and to do so free from the pain of violating the state’s anti-
discrimination laws.149 
As background, Philips’s artistic speech freedom claims emerged in a distinct 
range of doctrinal terms. His merits brief alone features the claims as a stand-alone 
work-up of the import of artistry as a distinctive form of speech, as a compelled-speech 
claim, as an expressive conduct argument, and within the context of content and 
viewpoint discrimination bids.150 All these expressions advanced the notion that 
 
148  On the Constitution as “covenant,” see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 901 (1992) (“Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans 
to us and then to future generations. . . . We accept our responsibility not to retreat from 
interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents.”). For more on 
the Constitution as a document with a changing meaning in the context of lesbian and gay rights, 
see, for example, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“History and tradition 
guide and discipline this inquiry [into fundamental rights] but do not set its outer boundaries. . 
. . The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. . . . When new 
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal 
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”); id. at 2603 (“Indeed, in interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can 
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed 
unnoticed and unchallenged.”). 
149  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
150  Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 17 (“The Free Speech Clause protects both 
expression and expressive conduct. This Court must initially decide whether Phillips’s custom 
wedding cakes are artistic expression.”); id. at 19 (“Phillips’s custom wedding cakes are his 
artistic expression because he intends to, and does in fact, communicate through them.”); id. at 
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there’s something about art and artistry, with their special emphasis on expression, 
hence communication, that the First Amendment speech clause, with its values and 
doctrinal forms, should be understood to countenance and protect.151  
Equally salient as a shared feature of these various constitutional expressions of 
the idea that Phillips’s artistry is protected as First Amendment speech is how they 
relied on the standard secular language of other speech rights, an orientation that all 
constitutional rights share. But if First Amendment protections themselves were 
secular in their basic form, in content they were not. For Phillips, the speech right to 
artistry is religious. His artistry is indissolubly bound up with his faith. In Phillips’s 
briefs, this is a point of pride, as when it is said that he uses his artistry—from the 
earliest stages of his artistic process to the deployment of his talents in preparing a 
finished work: a custom-made cake—for the glory of his God.152 Wedding cakes, his 
papers argued, are distinctive not only in their historical and present-day social 
meanings, but, in Phillips’s artistic-religious view, because weddings celebrate 
marriage, which definitionally involves the union of one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, a sacred union that “exemplifies the relationship of Christ and His 
Church,” and that accordingly manifests and furthers “God’s design.”153 The Heavenly 
 
23 (“Phillips’s creation of custom wedding cakes at least qualifies as a form of expressive 
conduct.”); id. at 27–28 (“[T]he Commission directly interfered with Phillips’s artistic 
discretion” and “forced him to express views different from his own.”); id. at 35 (“Ordering 
citizens to engage in unwanted artistic expression is such an affront to the First Amendment 
freedoms that no less than strict scrutiny will do.”); id. (“Phillips triggered CADA only because 
he addressed the topic of marriage through his art . . . Penalizing an artist because of the topics 
on which he has chosen to speak is decidedly content based.”); id. at 36 (“Going beyond mere 
content discrimination, the Commission has engaged in viewpoint discrimination . . . [because] 
the Commission’s order here requires Phillips to express ideas diametrically opposed to his 
own.”). For an incisive take on the artistic freedom arguments in the case, see Robert Post, What 
About the Free Speech Clause in Masterpiece?, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 13, 2018), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-about-the-free-speech-clause-issue-in-masterpiece. See 
also James Hart, When the First Amendment Compels an Offensive Result: Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 79 LA. L. REV. 419, 427–36 (2018) 
(arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop involves compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination). 
151  It may thus be that, in a certain sense, describing Phillips’s custom cake-making as art, 
including for constitutional purposes, gives it both expressive, and so distinctive First 
Amendment, legs, while also functionally serving to limit its still otherwise potentially 
sweeping (and so not unproblematic) scope. Thanks to Dan Tokaji for conversation on this 
point. 
152  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16–111) (discussing the relation between 
Phillips’s “religious conviction” and his wedding celebration cakes). 
153  Id. at 6; id. at 5–6 (“Of any form of cake, wedding cakes have the longest and richest 
history. In modern Western culture, the wedding cake serves a central expressive component at 
most weddings and is traditionally served at the reception celebrating the couple’s union . . . . 
[It] forms the centerpiece of a ritual in which the couple celebrates their marriage by feeding 
each other cake and then sharing cake with their guests. Only a wedding cake communicates 
this special celebratory message . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 
S. Ct. at 1724 (“Jack Phillips is an expert baker[.] . . . Phillips is a devout Christian. He has 
 
45Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
392 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:347 
Father looms here as the Great Creator, the Author of All Things—making him, 
among all else, The Artist of Artists. There being consonance, harmony, and beauty 
in the dynamic unity of Phillips’s art and faith, a unity that is revealed in the good 
work of his wedding cakes, his refusal on religious scruples “to use his creative talents 
to design and create cakes that violate his religious beliefs” is but another way he 
submits in his devotion and “honors God.”154 Preferring not to is not resistance for 
resistance’s sake, but art’s, which in Phillips’s case, makes it also for religion’s.155 
Central as his God is to Phillips’s artistry, faith is not, for constitutional purposes, 
offered up as a necessary condition for the exercise of the First Amendment right 
claimed on his behalf, here, again, a secular right to speech protections for his art, 
which liberate it from state anti-discrimination regulation.  
The apparent overlap between Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims to artistic 
freedom and his First Amendment claims to religious freedom makes it easy to 
imagine these arguments have no meaningful independence of terms.156  There may 
be truth to that as a matter of litigation tactics, but the protections for artistic freedom 
that Phillips sought, transcend creativity’s inspirational source as well as its aims. 
Hence the alliance Phillips’s arguments tried to build with artists everywhere, be they 
faithful or faithless, as with his merits brief’s ominous warning early on that “a ruling 
against Phillips [on First Amendment speech grounds] threatens the expressive 
freedom of all who create art or other speech for a living.”157 
While the First Amendment claims for artistic freedom were leading arguments in 
the Supreme Court litigation phase of Masterpiece Cakeshop—they were featured as 
the principal arguments in Phillips’s paper submissions, and, perhaps more 
importantly, they grounded the federal government’s arguments in the case—Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion downgrades them to claims of relatively minor textual 
significance.158 They are found dwelling more or less at the operative margins of the 
Court’s official text.159  
What little Masterpiece Cakeshop ventures to say about the First Amendment 
speech protections for artistic freedom, it says while regularly keeping their precise 
 
explained that his ‘main goal in life is to be obedient to’ Jesus Christ and Christ’s ‘teachings in 
all aspects of his life.’ And he seeks to ‘honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.’ 
One of Phillips’ religious beliefs is that ‘God’s intention for marriage from the beginning of 
history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.’ To Phillips, creating a 
wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that 
is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.” (citations omitted)). 
154  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 150, at 5. 
155  Id. at 5–6. 
156  One version of the thought would be that the First Amendment religious freedom claims 
“really” drive both. 
157  Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 3. 
158  See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at i, 16–37; Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 9–33, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16–111). 
159  On these claims being pushed to the margins of Masterpiece Cakeshop, see, in addition 
to aspects of the opinion discussed in the text, for example, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 
at 1723, 1726. 
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doctrinal variations blurred in their focus, and while regarding their central impulse—
that the First Amendment protects speech that includes artistic freedom in state-power-
limiting ways—with an admixture of openness, sympathy, but, finally, discernibly 
active doubt.160 
Early on, Masterpiece Cakeshop remarks that “[t]he free speech aspect of this case 
is difficult[.]”161 In the context of Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims for artistic 
freedom made to the Court, which the Court’s opinion duly acknowledges, this 
suggestion indicates the Court finds it “difficult” to accept the claims outright.162 
Explaining why, the Court observes that “few persons who have seen a beautiful 
wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech.”163 
It is hard to read this passage and not surmise the Court is at least partly talking about 
itself. Among those “few persons” anyway, may have been a few of the Justices who, 
like others, before Masterpiece Cakeshop may never have thought about 
constitutionally protected speech when they saw a beautiful wedding cake, which they 
then proceeded to eat. One doesn’t eat words like that. 
Ordinarily, the Court’s response to a previously unheard-of position like this First 
Amendment speech claim, particularly as the source of a binding rule of constitutional 
law that would forever bind and govern the nation, would be in the form of swift and 
certain dismissal. But the Court resists and pulls its punch. “[F]ew persons” who have 
ever “seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought” of its artistic creation as 
constitutionally safeguarded free speech, but that, Masterpiece Cakeshop indicates, 
 
160  An exception arises in the Court’s treatment of the religious liberty argument. See 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (“The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ could 
reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved, 
quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be distinguished.”). See also infra note 
185. 
161  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.  
162  There are two passages in which the Court unambiguously recognizes the relationship 
between Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims and how they’re grounded in his argument 
in notions of artistic freedom. The first arrives as the Court discusses proceedings below. Id. at 
1726. The second arrives as the Court is discussing Phillips’s argument to the Court. Id. at 1728 
(“He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding 
endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would see the case, this 
contention has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and 
sincere religious beliefs.”). This second passage is discussed in greater detail below. See infra 
text accompanying notes 167–175. 
163  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723; accord Brief of American Unity Fund & Profs. 
Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16–111) (“[C]ake-making—even cake-making for ceremonial 
occasions (such as weddings and birthdays)—lacks any . . . longstanding legal recognition as 
an expressive medium. . . . [T]he absence of any case law protecting the expressiveness of cake 
baking suggests that it has not been regarded in our constitutional tradition as a medium of 
expression. That makes cake baking distinct from long-recognized mediums of expression such 
as writing, singing, or photography.”); Post, supra note 150 (“Phillips’ claim that his free speech 
rights were infringed faced the obvious objection that baking is a simple provision of services 
rather than a medium for the communication of ideas.”). For contextualized, critical engagement 
with Carpenter and Volokh’s position, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY? THE UNNECESSARY CONFLICT (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 71–72, 81–82). 
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might turn out to be all that’s required to do the constitutional trick.164 “This,” the 
Court flatly observes, “is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the 
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding 
of their meaning.”165 
This statement, with its “is,” is remarkable. In a decision affecting the rights of 
lesbians and gay men written by Justice Kennedy, it also feels portentous. The 
language of the Court’s instruction conjures the familiar sound of the Court ringing 
this very bell in its earlier pro-lesbian-and-gay rights decisions as they proudly, if not 
uncontroversially, broke new constitutional ground, stoking the forces of living 
constitutionalism.166 What’s more, and more disconcerting, the massively obvious 
social differences between the claims of liberty involved in those lesbian and gay 
rights cases and in this one do not register at all at this point in the opinion. The social 
movement work, the organizing, the actions, the contests, the setbacks, the 
regroupings, not to forget the study, the thinking, and the writing, along with all the 
other struggles and bodily tolls during the long, dark years of homosexuality’s 
outlawry and the national debates about it all, all of which finally moved the country 
and then the Court to recognize the liberty, equality, and first-class citizenship claims 
of lesbians and gay men, are now lined up in a comparative way with a breezy idea 
fronted in litigation that has not been the subject of any national debate, hence testing, 
and that could not have been, because, as the Court itself authoritatively says, “few 
persons” had even thought or heard of the idea animating it before now. But no matter. 
The prospects of constitutional reform are anyway tacitly potentially equated. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop formally declines to opine on the merits of any of the First 
Amendment speech claims involving artistic freedom, but that declination is attended 
by a courtly openness to the very ideas that the Court officially refuses to accept. For 
now. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms its openness to the idea of First Amendment 
protections for artistic freedom later on. During a larger discussion emphasizing the 
constitutional, legal, and citizenship status of lesbians and gay men, which 
underscores the existence and “unexceptional” nature of anti-discrimination laws, the 
Court acknowledges that Phillips “claims” his artistry is protected as a First 
Amendment speech matter.167 Notice how the opinion’s text, which goes out of its 
 
164  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
165  Id. 
166  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The nature of injustice is 
that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment . . . entrusted to future generations a charter protecting 
the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578–79 (2003) (“[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment . . . knew times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.”). 
167  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. The text at this point raises a prospect that this 
talk of the “unexceptional” nature of anti-discrimination law undercuts ideas that see this large, 
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way to flag Phillips’s association of protected speech and art, shifts its own perspective 
while describing Phillips’s position: 
[Phillips] argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive 
statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation. 
As Phillips would see the case, this contention has a significant First 
Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere 
religious beliefs. In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a 
line where the customers’ right to goods and services became a demand for 
him to exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message, 
a message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious 
beliefs.168 
The opinion’s sensibilities here are nuanced and become increasingly fictive, 
hence literary. The opinion’s observations, which finally figure the Court not simply 
as repeating Phillips’s argument objectively but discovering it operating in Phillips’s 
head, is scarcely epistemically modest in any meaningful jurisprudential sense. 
Narratively speaking, its qualities are imagined and omniscient. Past its qualification 
(“the baker likely found it difficult . . .”), the opinion proceeds as though the Court has 
direct access to the baker’s interiority, his perspective, his thoughts, and more, 
including how belief in the Spirit touches his heart and organizes his faithful 
obligations in relation to law.169 In this respect, the opinion temporarily performs a 
complete merger with Phillips through an identification with him, a multiples-in-one 
union that reads as an indication not only of an openness to Phillips’s speech claim, 
but a highly identified, hence sympathetic, engagement with it, as well. Clearly, the 
Court is seriously contemplating his position, imagining affording his artistry First 
Amendment speech protections, just as Phillips asked.170 
What this means for how far Masterpiece Cakeshop is willing to go on Phillips’s 
First Amendment speech and artistry arguments will become clearer soon enough, but 
before getting to that there’s the question of why the opinion goes out of its way to 
identify itself with Phillips in relation to his First Amendment speech claims and their 
protections for artistic expression. One prospect of what, in fact, is undoubtedly an 
 
complex body of law as having constitutional stature. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2018); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN 
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2013). Here, by 
contrast, they may be thought to be no different than unexceptional laws, like traffic ordinances. 
Recognizing this possibility, the weight of the opinion seems to run closer to Ackerman’s view 
than this one, without finally settling anything. Just so, there is also a comparison on all this to 
Hosanna Tabor, in which anti-discrimination norms were not, to say the least, heavily weighted 
in the face of religious liberty claims. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012) (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging 
that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The 
church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”). See also discussion supra 
Part I.B.1. 
168  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
169  Id. (emphasis added). 
170  The good news here is that the opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, makes this at least in 
part a same-sex merger? 
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over-determined answer is that the Court’s convergence with Phillips has less to do 
with the Court’s own normative view of the claims he’s made than it is about a 
majority of the Court being comfortable offering what may be regarded as anodyne 
expressions of openness and identification with, and an understanding of, Phillips’s 
position. After all, two of the Justices who join the Court’s opinion basically accept it. 
The story here is judicial strategy all over again.171  
This much, as a partial explanation, comes into view through Justice Clarence 
Thomas’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, which validates and 
normalizes what it dubs Phillips’s “free-speech claim” far in excess of the majority’s 
identification with Phillips and his views.172 The concurrence gets, accepts, and would 
have the Court deliver Phillips constitutional First Amendment speech protection for 
his art. The concurrence endorses the view that Phillips’s custom cake making—
“creating and designing custom wedding cakes”—is “expressive conduct,” a 
conclusion it reaches via a line of thought emphasizing and accepting that Phillips-
the-baker should be seen constitutionally as Phillips-the-baker-artist whose cakeshop 
is an artistic studio proudly held out to the world as such and whose artistic creations 
result from a highly intentional artistic process.173 Thus: “Phillips’ creation of custom 
wedding cakes is expressive. The use of his artistic talents to create a well-recognized 
symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage clearly communicates a 
message.”174 This message, the concurrence maintains, is altered by the state’s public 
accommodations law, which “[f]orc[es] Phillips . . . to, at the very least, acknowledge 
that same-sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and [to] suggest that they should be 
celebrated—the precise message he believes his faith forbids.”175 Both against, but 
also in a sense with, this thinking, which the concurrence rounds out and defends, the 
majority opinion’s willingness to be open to, and sympathetically to identify with, 
Phillips and his position may operate as a kind of transference in which the Court 
wishes to perform a limited solidarity with the views expressed in Justice Thomas’s 
 
171  See generally MURPHY, supra note 97. 
172 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); see also, generally, id. at 1740–48. See also, e.g., Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 158, at 8 (“The law compels Phillips to design and create 
a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple, if he would do the same for an opposite-sex 
couple. A custom wedding cake is a form of expression, whether pure speech or the product of 
expressive conduct. It is an artistic creation that is both subjectively intended and objectively 
perceived as a celebratory symbol of marriage.”). 
173  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742–44 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
174  Id. at 1743. An illuminating counterpoint is in WENDY BROWN, Speaking Wedding Cakes 
and Praying Pregnancy Centers, in IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF 
ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE WEST 123, 137 (2019) (Phillips’s wedding “cakes carry . . . 
religious meaning for him, though not necessarily for others and thus not necessarily when they 
‘speak’ wedding at the events they adorn. Phillips himself speaks, then, not through his art, but 
through his willingness or refusal to provision for events he believes to be divinely ordained or 
condemned.”). 
175  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
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concurrence. If so, the Court may have ultimately done so for itself, as a way to draw 
Justice Thomas’s vote and hold it in the Court’s opinion’s fold. 
Still, there are different kinds of openness and identificatory sympathy, and 
indications in Masterpiece Cakeshop are that, on the other side of them in the case are 
discernible reserves of constitutional doubt. This is the indication that comes through 
the opinion as it releases its temporary identification with Phillips in order to turn to 
an explanation for why the Court thinks he was “not unreasonable” in making the 
choice he did to refuse Craig and Mullins the custom wedding celebration cake that 
they wanted at the time they wanted it.176 What’s about to materialize is a highly 
temporized constitutional speech gambit that shows the dynamism of rules in an 
evolving constitutional ecosystem. 
The Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion explains that Phillips’s decision not to 
use his artistry to create the custom wedding cake Craig and Mullins wanted may have 
been understandable at the time of his refusal. This is a function, as the Court describes 
it, of Phillips’s concern with the expressive meaning and the value of making the 
couple the custom cake they desired for their marriage celebration. Syntactically, the 
opinion’s account is agonized. Noting that Phillips’s “actions leading to the refusal of 
service . . . occurred in the year 2012[,]” the Court timestamps the refusal as occurring 
both before Colorado legalized same-sex marriage and before the Court’s rulings in 
United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges.177 The opinion goes on to remark:  
Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in 
Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not 
unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he 
understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that 
expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, at least 
insofar as his refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a 
message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take place in 
another State.178  
Leaving aside how the Court re-identifies itself with Phillips in this passage, even 
seeming to confuse its own authority to declare what this law is with his authority to 
“deem” his own refusal of service “lawful,” more significant for present purposes is 
the proliferation of subordinate clauses in the Court’s account. With their various 
qualifications, they indicate the Court is pumping the brakes on its own thinking. 
Slowed down a bit to restate it, the Court’s notion is straightforward, if also surprising. 
Since at the time Phillips refused to make Craig and Mullins the custom wedding cake 
they wanted they did not have a right to marry under Colorado law or the federal 
Constitution, there’s “some force” to the idea it was understandable—more exactly: 
“not unreasonable”—for Phillips to have imagined that using his artistry the way that 
Craig and Mullins wanted him to might well have been taken to send a message of 
support for their marriage or the right-to-marry project, “the precise message,” as 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence puts it, that Phillips “believes his faith forbids.”179 One 
 
176  Id. at 1728 (majority opinion). 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Id.; id. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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implication of this position—or just a click away from it—would seem to be that 
Phillips may have acted lawfully, consistent with his rights at the time he refused this 
service. How this is so should become more apparent presently. 
On a technical, objective level, the Court’s perspective is pure speculation, ipse 
dixit, nothing more. It delivers a retrospective verdict on the then-once-would-have-
been social meaning of Phillips making a custom wedding cake for a same-sex 
wedding celebration situated at that time, in that place, and in that setting—an 
eventuality, to be clear, that never came to pass—and it delivers that verdict without 
citing any authority for this never-eventuated action’s expressive meaning. Bracketing 
those concerns, the opinion’s point is easily allowed as more or less right as a loose 
conversational observation seeking to describe how some people back in 2012 in 
Colorado might reasonably have understood Phillips’s use of his artistic skills had he 
agreed to use them in the ways that Craig and Mullins asked and against his own faith. 
Noteworthy about this thinking in Masterpiece Cakeshop is less its historically 
situated, but counterfactual, hermeneutics than how, on reflection, it shows the Court’s 
opinion is suggesting—through an imbedded negative logic—that Colorado law 
having now changed to recognize same-sex marriage, and Windsor and Obergefell 
having now been decided, it is no longer reasonable for Phillips or anyone else to think 
that his willingness to use his artistry to make a custom cake for gay fellas like Craig 
and Mullins sends any message of support for them, their marriage, or the right to 
marry, more generally.180 Whatever Phillips’s inspiration as an artist and whatever 
 
180  Here one might think of some of the individualized discriminatory options that some who 
sought to resist the march of civil rights historically availed themselves of. See, e.g., JUDITH 
ROLLINS, ALL IS NEVER SAID: THE NARRATIVE OF ODETTE HARPER HINES 197 (1995) (offering, 
as part of an account of the “very first day of testing” by Judy and Betty Chenevert “at a number 
of restaurants on Highway 71” before they learned the technique of it, that there was “no telling 
what those angry crackers might have put in their food. At one restaurant, they saw the man spit 
into their Cokes and they didn’t drink them. But what might have been put in their food at other 
restaurants that they didn’t see? Spit or worse.”); JORDANA Y. SHAKOOR, CIVIL RIGHTS 
CHILDHOOD 152 (1999) (“Many blacks in Greenwood preferred to continue to hang out on 
Johnson Street. The right to vote was one thing; eating alongside resentful whites was another. 
Those who could afford it had to wonder whether eating a nice juicy steak was worth possibly 
receiving burnt food or meals that might have spit or something worse seasoning them.”). A 
return that some might regard as doing rough justice is described in William Serrin, Jesse 
Jackson: ‘I Am . . .’ Audience: ‘I Am . . .’ Jesse: ‘Somebody’s Audience: ‘Somebody,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (July 9, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/09/archives/jesse-jackson-i-am-
audience-i-am-jesse-somebody-audience-somebody.html (“Always, Jackson was defiant. As a 
young man, when he worked as a waiter in the Jack Tar Hotel in Greenville, S.C., and whites 
did not tip him, Jesse would spit into their soup or salad before he brought it to the table, and 
watch with enjoyment as whites ate gobs of saliva as though it were, say, oil and vinegar 
dressing.”). Relatedly, in the context of homophobically inflected discourses, there are the 
straight nightmares of gay men discussed to dramatic effect in DOUGLAS CRIMP, Randy Shilts’s 
Miserable Failure, in MELANCHOLIA AND MORALISM: ESSAYS ON AIDS AND QUEER POLITICS 
118–19, 124 (2002) (describing homophobic fantasies about “gay foreigners attending health 
conferences” and gay waiters and salad dressing). Along similar lines, see also James E. 
Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. 
REV. 97, 111–12 (“The Ninth Circuit . . . deferred to defendants’ explanation for excluding 
HIV-positive inmates from serving food to the mainline population. The defendants asserted 
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artistic message of faith he may intend to convey through his art, its received social 
meaning as expression, at least so far as the Court is presently concerned, is to be 
understood in the context and against the backdrop of a politically liberal 
constitutional regime in which marriage is marriage is marriage. Constitutionally 
speaking, all marriages are alike. Same-sex marriage has ceased being a term of 
political contest and meaning in constitutional terms. There are not real weddings and 
“weddings” in scare quotes as in Justice Thomas’s concurrence.181 This, of course, 
helps explain why many, disagreeing with Justice Thomas’s concurrence, presently 
believe that Phillips’s custom-made wedding cakes don’t have any constitutionally 
cognizable expressive dimension at all, and why they don’t indicate any kind of 
support for the right to marry, or dissent from it, that the First Amendment’s speech 
clause protects. Not least of all in view of positive law obligations of equal treatment, 
themselves consistent with constitutional norms of equality as set forth in Obergefell, 
a wedding cake, without more, is just a wedding cake. 
From a different angle of vision, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s observations on the “not 
unreasonableness” of Phillips’s idea that making a custom cake for Craig and 
Mullins’s wedding celebration in 2012 would send a message of support for same-sex 
marriage against his faith resonate quite well, if not exactly perfectly, with elements 
of the Court’s First Amendment “expressive conduct” doctrine.182 Here, the majority’s 
silence speaks in ways that put its opinion at odds with Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence.183  
That disagreement obtaining, it is easy to imagine why the majority does not come 
out and say what the logic of its historical hermeneutics may be taken to imply: that 
no reasonable observer would now take Phillips to be supporting same-sex marriage 
when, consistent with the obligations of state law, themselves consistent with the 
state’s own constitutional equality obligations, he uses his artistry to make a couple 
like Craig and Mullins a custom wedding celebration cake. But if the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop majority opinion is constrained, free only to leave its views implicitly 
submerged in its text to be discovered or not via close and careful reading, Justice 
 
that they had catered to inmates’ ‘think[ing] the worst—that . . . [HIV-positive food servers] 
will bleed into the food, spit into the food, or even worse. This . . . could lead to ‘violent actions’ 
against HIV-positive food servers.”). 
181  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (“Forcing Phillips to make custom wedding cakes for same-sex marriages 
requires him to, at the very least, acknowledge that same-sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and 
suggest that they should be celebrated—the precise message he believes his faith forbids.”).  
182  See infra note 183. 
183  Although Justice Thomas’s concurrence recognizes that, “[o]f course, conduct does not 
qualify as protected speech simply because ‘the person engaging in [it] intends thereby to 
express an idea,’” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)), it 
immediately goes on to add: “To determine whether conduct is sufficiently expressive, the Court 
asks whether it was ‘intended to be communicative’ and, ‘in context, would reasonably be 
understood by the viewer to be communicative.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); see also id. at 1742–44 (discussing related aspects of the 
doctrinal point). For a sharp response to the concurrence’s mobilization of these doctrinal 
points, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 163 (manuscript at 75–77). 
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Thomas’s concurrence, by contrast, is free to express its disagreement with the 
implications that follow from the majority opinion’s text and thoughts. And it does. It 
swings away directly at the logical implications of what the majority says, repudiating 
the idea that “Obergefell v. Hodges somehow diminish[es] Phillips’ right to free 
speech.”184 Notice, though, what else this suggests: That Masterpiece Cakeshop has 
nodded toward approval for the kernel of an argument that indicates that Phillips once, 
as late as 2012 and maybe later, until Obergefell, may have had a right to free speech 
that protected his artistry just the way he claimed in Masterpiece Cakeshop. At least 
that view in the Court’s view has “some force.” That qualification plus the careful use 
of the double negative—“not unreasonably”—separates the opinion from any 
retrospective ruling, but its care suggests the Court sees and can imagine itself 
embracing that possibility—or might have. What result in Masterpiece Cakeshop if its 
litigation timeline had been such that it had arrived at the Court before Windsor and 
Obergefell? 
While Masterpiece Cakeshop arcs in these directions, suggesting no speech 
protections now obtain for artistry that once might have been protected, it is striking 
that, in making the points it does, the decision keeps all the potentially associated First 
Amendment doctrinal scaffolding—involving expressive conduct and compelled 
speech, principally—far away from the page.185 Still, the passage isn’t wholly lacking 
in all authoritative supports. The cases Masterpiece Cakeshop does cite as it works its 
way through this subtle line of thought have, to a number, a decidedly pro-lesbian-
and-gay cast to them: Windsor, Obergefell, and state court rulings from Colorado that 
the Court takes to have authorized bakers back in 2012 to refuse “to create cakes with 
decorations that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages.”186 The weight of authority 
in this setting, which partly cuts in the direction of an erstwhile right to speech that 
might have given the Phillips of 2012 a constitutional right to refuse a public 
accommodation as he did, now points in the opposite direction, which happens to be 
the same direction as the implicit logic of what the Court writes: In the balance of 
competing interests, the Court is against, not with, Phillips’s First Amendment speech 
claims for artistic expression. The Court occupies that ground as a way of vindicating 
the constitutional rights that its decisions, including Windsor and Obergefell, 
announced, the overall significations of which are not to be demeaned any more than 
lesbians and gay men themselves are through a First Amendment rule exempting 
Phillips and other artists from anti-discrimination rules. 
Temporized and tempered thinking like this, found in the cool silences of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s text, doesn’t produce the sound, excitement, drama, or the 
 
184  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
185  Saying this this way is meant to consider that moment in Masterpiece Cakeshop when the 
Court, in a highly specific factual setting, contemplates the prospects of a speech claim based 
on a discriminatory viewpoint problem. Id. at 1730 (majority opinion) (“The treatment of the 
other cases and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the 
question of whether speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be 
distinguished.”). In saying what it does on this front, the Court seems to be expressly leaving 
open the prospect of at least certain viewpoint-based and maybe content-based discriminations. 
The argument in the text should be read with this qualification in mind. 
186  Id. at 1728. 
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certainty of a gavel dropping and the loud announcement of a ruling against Phillips 
on First Amendment speech and artistic freedom grounds. It’s a much subtler gesture 
of power, filled with meditative cues that appear only through a search into recesses 
of the Court’s text. Masterpiece Cakeshop doesn’t expressly accept or reject Phillips’s 
First Amendment speech arguments for artistic protection, indeed, it expressly 
indicates it’s not passing on them, which leaves the Court at liberty to rule on them 
however it may in some future case. Masterpiece Cakeshop, however, indicates that 
this Court isn’t having them, certainly not the way Justice Thomas’s concurrence is. 
Once upon a time, yes . . . perhaps (the arguments back then had “some force”), but 
no longer. For the majority, views and constitutional arguments, and so positive law 
and constitutional rights and rules, can wax and wane.187 
This all points to a different reading and explanation of the Court’s merger-
identification with Phillips. It is more than a psychologically curious demonstration of 
sympathies with and for him and his position. What it also is, is an active 
demonstration that the Court has heard, understood, and appreciated his speech 
arguments for artistic freedom under the First Amendment, and that it has heard, 
understood, and appreciated where they—and he—were coming from, especially at 
the time he refused to use his artistry to make Craig and Mullins the custom cake to 
celebrate their wedding that they wanted, when the Court—if it had been asked to do 
so—might have confirmed them. In this respect, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s treatment 
of Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims for artistic freedom reflects not largesse, 
 
187 The same conclusion is confirmed by an additional textual check found in what 
Masterpiece Cakeshop says as it draws this section of discussion to a close, where it offers a 
remark previously encountered in the context of Phillips’s Free Exercise claim. By this point, it 
is clear that a passage capping a discussion that in part involves Phillips’s First Amendment 
speech bids may carry with it both implications for both his speech/artistry and his religious 
liberty claims. With that in mind, here’s the relevant language from the case: 
[A]ny decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest 
all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and 
religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services 
will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a 
serious stigma on gay persons.  
Id. at 1728–29. 
As before, if in different ways here, the best arguments for a limited right to free speech in 
the form of artistry that could be mustered at the time of Masterpiece Cakeshop were in fact 
supplied to the Court. Considering those arguments as presented on the paper, oral arguments 
in the case publicly revealed how deeply concerned the Justices were about their ability to find 
meaningful and principled limits for the First Amendment speech protections for Phillips’s 
artistry that they were being asked to approve. (The same basic point is made early on in the 
Court’s opinion in relation to both First Amendment speech and religious liberty claims. Id. at 
1723.) Unremarkably, Masterpiece Cakeshop mentions no argument that could serve those 
purposes to its exacting standards without creating a constitutional exception to the state’s anti-
discrimination rules that would, in practical consequence, “impose a serious stigma on gay 
persons” by allowing them to receive unequal treatment in the public sphere. Id. at 1729. 
Evidently, the Court felt uncompelled to enter the doctrinal fray by registering this point even 
more emphatically than it has, and if it did, it might have disturbed the finely wrought balance 
required to build and sustain a supermajority opinion in a controversial case like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. 
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politesse, or etiquette simply, but something deeper, more in the model of an idealized 
case disposition by an institution of the government managed by agents in a politically 
liberal constitutional regime, who, when making binding rules of law backed by the 
state’s coercive powers, are supposed to provide public justifications for their 
decisions that address those whom their rules will govern as rational, autonomous 
citizens whose comprehensive worldviews are, if not as governance rules, deserving 
of respect.188 
If, as seems likely, the First Amendment speech arguments for protecting artistic 
freedom return to the Court, they are returned at their bringers’ peril.189 Judging from 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, they face a significant risk of loss. Insofar as Masterpiece 
Cakeshop is the indication, what these arguments may be expected to encounter is a 
Court that, while maintaining formally that it has not decided the First Amendment 
speech issues Phillips raised, has deeply wrestled with them and finally produced a set 
of thoughts that, however provisionally, are inconsistent with them as ways to 
vindicate protections for artists, including artists of faith. A new theory, a new 
principle, new arguments with new limits, and/or a materially changed politico-legal 
context could gain First Amendment speech protections for artistic freedom a different 
hearing. They could also produce a different result than in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 
So much is always a possibility under a living Constitution—the kind of 
Constitution that Masterpiece Cakeshop demonstrates yet again that we live under. 
For now and the foreseeable future, the First Amendment speech arguments for the 
artistic freedom of artists like Phillips-the-artist-of-faith and others do not command a 
majority of the Supreme Court.  
Perhaps this goes without saying, but recalling some of what Oscar Wilde taught 
about aesthetics and the perils of certainty about the interplay of surface and depth, it 
seems worth confirming that this depth sounding of the opinion is a deeper and more 
textually engaged way of reaching a conclusion that, in rough form, can immediately 
be read off the surface of the ruling’s basic decisional architecture.190 Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in the case formally supplied any Justice who wished to take advantage 
of it a chance to indicate his or her support for First Amendment speech protections 
for artistry like Phillips’s.191 Justice Gorsuch was the only taker. 
 
188  For thoughtful thoughts on etiquette and Masterpiece Cakeshop, see Kendrick & 
Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 133. A sharp and accessible introduction to public justification, 
including John Rawls’s idea of it, is in Public Justification, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N Zalta ed., Spring 2018 ed.), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/. 
189  See, e.g., Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (mem.) 
(remanding the case “in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n.”). Other 
cases will certainly arise to enable the issue’s return to the Supreme Court. 
190  OSCAR WILDE, The Preface, in THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 3 (Michael Patrick Gillespie 
ed., 2007) (“All art is at once surface and symbol. / Those who go beneath the surface do so at 
their peril. / Those who read the symbol do so at their peril.”). 
191  “His” or “her” only, because there’s no “their” there yet, on which, see Jessica A. Clarke, 
They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019). 
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II. THE POLITICAL HOMILETICS OF THE TEXT 
Now that all of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s cross-cutting substantive holdings are in 
sight, it’s almost time to offer a final assessment of how the opinion should be 
understood in terms of narrowness, shallowness, and modesty. First, though, these 
remarks on two broadly different, but related types of instruction the opinion gives—
one properly legal, the other moral-political—that arrive just as the opinion draws to 
a close. Having considered them on their own terms, in their variations, one of them 
is reconfigured as an aesthetic proposition to see what sorts of prospects it holds. 
A. Tolerance by Courts 
Having reached this point with Masterpiece Cakeshop, all that’s left to consider in 
a formal sense is its final substantive passage. This last, climatic moment in the text 
arrives, obviously enough, after its holding and shadow holdings have been issued. 
Unlike other similarly placed passages in other Kennedy opinions that have gone on 
to become famous, the drama of this one is not simply a function of its textual position, 
where it crystallizes key teachings the opinion means to give in one final burst.192  In 
addition to being the endcap to this particular decision, this passage is also the endcap 
to Justice Kennedy’s writing on his legacy issue of lesbian and gay rights while 
speaking for the Court. His public letter of resignation would arrive later, but by the 
time Masterpiece Cakeshop came down, he certainly knew these were going to be his 
final words on the jurisprudential subject that, perhaps more than any other, would 
define his positive career as an Associate Justice.193 The significance of these remarks 
and their capacity to do the work that they’re about to be shown to be doing thus should 
not be doubted. 
Curiously, as a matter of style, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final remarks, despite their 
significance, eschew classic Kennedy grandness. This absence subtly colors them with 
an eerily deflated, melancholic air. The remarks, comprised of a single sentence with 
three subordinate clauses that constantly slow the reader down, are laconic, its 
language, if anything, spartan, maybe a tad meditative. Content-wise, the passage 
commences by addressing nobody in particular, hence everyone in general, weighing 
in on nothing so much as the general situation Masterpiece Cakeshop has implicated 
and resolved, if not, as it points out, for the last time. No sooner does the opinion start 
filling the details of that situation in than, in its second breath, the reader notices that 
the text, without announcing what it’s doing, has shifted direction. It has begun 
specifically addressing itself to courts, which are being given marching orders about 
how they should consider and resolve cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop in the future. 
 
192  See, for example, the concluding substantive paragraphs in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 578–79 (2003). 
193  Masterpiece Cakeshop was handed down on June 4, 2018, and Justice Kennedy’s public 
announcement arrived on June 27, 2018. Letter of Resignation from Anthony M. Kennedy, 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Donald J. Trump, President, U.S. (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/Letter_to_the_President_June27.pdf. See also 
Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 
2018, at A1.  
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The template is, of course, one that Masterpiece Cakeshop itself sets. The Court 
comments: 
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further 
elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes 
must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere 
religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when 
they seek goods and services in an open market.194 
Note with precision where and how Masterpiece Cakeshop is prophesying disputes 
in “cases like this in other circumstances” will be “resolved” in the future.195 “[T]hese 
disputes” are going to be settled “in the courts”—courts that are being instructed to 
reflect upon and perform the single-word mantra—“tolerance”—that the opinion 
immediately proceeds to give specific content.196 The substance here arrives not in an 
affirmative sense—“Tolerance, Tolerance shalt thou pursue”—but through two 
injunctive commands issued in succession both in the form of thou-shalt-not’s.197 The 
language of the commands places them comfortably within the Constitution’s dialect 
of negative rights, which, presumably, is their source. The first commandment, which 
sounds in the registers of the First Amendment, holds that courts shall not show 
“undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs.”198 The second, which sounds in the 
registers of the Fourteenth Amendment, maintains that courts shall not “subject[] gay 
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”199 Taken 
together, these commandments reflect and convey what the opinion has effectively 
already, earlier made clear: the basically equal constitutional stature of these two ways 
of life. Here, courts are to afford them equal respects—show them tolerance—by 
avoiding the Scylla of anti-religious discrimination and the Charybdis of anti-gay 
sentiment as they do their job of “resolv[ing]” “cases like this in other circumstances” 
and “elaborat[ing]” their “outcome[s].”200 
 
194  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018). 
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks for Touro 
Synagogue (Newport, Rhode Island): Celebration of the 350th Anniversary of Jews in America 
(Aug. 22, 2004) (available at 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-22-04) (“The security I 
feel is shown by the command from Deuteronomy displayed in artworks, in Hebrew letters, on 
three walls and a table in my chambers. ‘Zedek, Zedek, tirdof’ ‘Justice, Justice shalt thou 
pursue,’ these art works proclaim; they are ever present reminders of what judges must do ‘that 
they may thrive.’”). 
198  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
199  Id. It is presently of no moment, though it is not insignificant, that the indignities that “gay 
persons” might otherwise suffer are harms that, in this passage, collapse traditional distinctions 
between economic and non-economic rights. The implications, traceable at least to United 
States v. Windsor, 580 U.S. 744 (2013), and back again, are potentially far-reaching. 
200  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. Insofar as these rules are constitutionally 
grounded, they, of course, also apply to other state actors, including legislators, hence implicate 
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Notwithstanding the evident care the opinion has taken to produce its multiple non-
affirmative locutions, the commandments it winds up issuing when carefully parsed 
are almost amusingly non-neutral as between the ways of life that they point to. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop tells courts that “these disputes must be resolved . . . without 
undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs.”201 The implication of this phrasing 
would ordinarily be that some “disrespect to sincere religious beliefs” may itself not 
be undue.202 Meantime, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s second commandment, that “these 
disputes must be resolved . . . without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they 
seek goods and services in an open market,” is, within the limits of the marketplace 
that it sets, perfectly categorical.203 “[G]ay persons,” which includes both lesbian 
women and gay men (the gendered erasure is subtle, but apparent), are to suffer no 
indignities in this respect.204 In this, the second commandment contrasts not only the 
first, but also that moment earlier in the opinion when the Court secures First 
Amendment protections for clergy who’d like to refuse to perform same-sex civil 
marriages when doing so contravenes their faith. While granting them that right, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop affirms this is a practical “diminishment” of lesbians’ and gay 
men’s rights by telling them they must lump it anyway, because this isn’t a “serious 
diminishment to their own dignity and worth.”205 In relation to economic freedom, the 
rights of “gay persons” must not be subjected to indignities.206 Economic equality, 
hence justice, for them is fully insured. 
This asymmetry readily lends itself to an understanding in which Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s final passage is offering courts its parting instruction on how they’re to 
resolve the question the case centrally involves, but formally evades, but then actually 
provides instruction on. Here the Court’s opinion recapitulates the impulse of its 
earlier thinking. In suggesting that the rights of sincere religious believers may be 
given due disrespects, while the rights of lesbians and gay men not to suffer indignities 
in the marketplace is categorical, the opinion tips its hand on the outcome it wants to 
see in a future case: public accommodations regimes hold against constitutional claims 
to religious exception. 
It’s dangerous business to try to read the passage as ordering any more broadly 
binding instruction than that. Masterpiece Cakeshop, which otherwise takes such 
 
“the drafting of legislation,” on which, in this setting, see NeJaime & Siegel, Religious 
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop supra note 2, at 205, 221–
24. Of course, it is true that how and why courts decide as they do and not simply what they 
decide on the bottom-line is key to the successful judicial avoidance of these constitutional 
obstacles. 
201  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 1727. 
206  Id. at 1732. This doesn’t mean to foreclose the prospect that “the Court makes clear that 
exemptions must be limited to protect gays and lesbians not only from material but also from 
dignitary harm.” NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 2, at 215. 
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pains to remain scrupulously “fair and neutral” between the parties, so as to avoid 
committing the same mistake the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did, cannot at 
precisely this point in the opinion be ventilating an active and more general preference 
for “gay persons” and their ways of life over “sincere religious belie[vers]” and 
theirs.207 Right? Right. This indicates that what the Court means when it refers to 
“cases like this in other circumstances” and “these disputes” in this passage, it doesn’t 
have in mind cases of a broad set to which Masterpiece Cakeshop belongs: cases that 
involve clashes between and among religious conservatives and traditional moralists, 
on the one hand, and lesbians and gay men, on the other.208 It is talking in a more 
bounded sense about Masterpiece Cakeshop as a case that involves a clash between 
these forces and the constitutional values that protect them on the turf of anti-
discrimination law.209 If this is right, a direct line might be drawn from Masterpiece 
Cakeshop to the proper resolution of the Title VII cases now before the Supreme 
Court, on the meaning of its sex discrimination protections.210 Figured as the latest 
front in Kulturkampf—and who would seriously deny that they are?—Masterpiece 
Cakeshop teaches that the victories go to lesbians and gay men, perhaps by extension 
to those who are transgender or otherwise gender nonconforming. As marketplace 
regulations, they are to suffer no indignities. How’s that for a departing bequeath? 
 
207  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729, 1732. 
208  Id. 
209  Even there, though, where the lesson of Masterpiece Cakeshop in principle should be that 
federal anti-discrimination protections are interpreted in accordance with the evolving 
constitutional status of lesbians and gay men as citizens of first-class rank, letting them in on 
Title VII’s sex discrimination protections, over and against religious conservatives and 
traditional moralists who would argue for a more conservative interpretive approach, it may be 
the connotative rather than the denotative meaning of this final passage that is the more enduring 
rule, now that Justice Kennedy has left the Court. Certainly, some of the Justices who signed 
the Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion were more inclined to a view that would take the 
final passage of Masterpiece Cakeshop as instructing courts, within the limits of the 
Constitution’s negativity, to demonstrate tolerance by both reflecting it toward the parties and 
their ways of life and by announcing results that seek to keep them in conditions of equipoise. 
If so, the rule of Masterpiece Cakeshop could be taken to be that lesbians and gay men can 
receive the protections of anti-discrimination law without First Amendment exceptions to it 
being created in cases where discriminators discriminate because of their sincere religious or 
moral beliefs. But to preserve the balance, that rule will only obtain where legislators, through 
law-making, have crafted the operative anti-discrimination rule that courts are being asked to 
affirm. 
210  Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 
1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599 
(2019). A primer on the cases is in Amy Howe, Court to Take Up LGBT Rights in the Workplace 
(Updated) (Apr. 22, 2019), SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/court-to-
take-up-lgbt-rights-in-the-workplace/. More in depth analysis of these cases as they were 
litigated at the Supreme Court is in Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
60https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5
2020] MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S HOMILETICS 407 
B. Toward a Political Morality: Minima and Maxima (Or: A Moral Politics 
of Sibling Love Introduced) 
     Lest it already be forgotten, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final passage isn’t only 
an instruction for courts. The passage only becomes that after starting out as a general 
address to no one, hence everyone, about the general situation that the case implicates. 
Of chief rank in this general class of the everyone that’s being addressed are 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s readers whose rights, welfare, and political prospects are 
most immediately and directly affected by the ruling. By this point, everyone knows 
who they are. 
     Masterpiece Cakeshop, though, is actually in no official position to speak to the 
parties whose ways of life its decision rules with the same authoritative voice used to 
instruct courts in the Court’s chain-of-command and that operate as the state’s 
Constitution-bound wings. This, as a rule, is because the Court’s constitutional 
authority is limited to negative instructions involving the state or, more capaciously, 
state action. For all the tremendous powers this affords the Court to manage parties 
and their ways of life, it is not officially empowered to boss them around. This doesn’t 
mean the Court is bereft of ways to give instructions to the parties themselves, only 
that it must do so in a different and unofficial mode. When it does this in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, what it does is to leverage the moral-political impulses that guide and shape 
its own conduct and the authoritative constitutional rules it formally announces in the 
direction of generating moral-political exhortations that are to function by willing 
private acquiescence in the vision the Court has for how they should conduct 
themselves as they pursue and seek to vindicate their ways of living in the public and 
political realms.211 To speak of this undertaking, then, is to speak of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s moral-political homiletics: its constitutionally inspired, but ultimately 
extra-constitutional, and, indeed, extra-legal teachings in political morality, which it 
recommends for the parties’ use on the field of politics that its substantive holdings 
don’t displace.212 
 
211  This is to reverse the standard translation of moral into constitutional questions that Robin 
West has described, among other places, in Robin West, Katrina, The Constitution, and the 
Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2006) (noting the easy, but 
problematic, constitutional-cultural translation of “substantial moral questions about 
governance” into “‘Constitutional’ questions” and the way this thus turns these moral questions 
into “questions of law awaiting judicial resolution”). Here, Masterpiece Cakeshop, without 
forgetting how it involves legal questions “awaiting judicial resolution,” id., also tracks the 
possibility of pressing them back into questions of governance for politics themselves. 
Reframed in terms that Jamal Greene has wonderfully put into play, this may be both a pathos-
based and an ethical argument. Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1390–91 (2013). 
212  In this respect anyway, Masterpiece Cakeshop may be taken not only to reflect “a specious 
neutrality,” but also to attempt to “affirmatively nurture democratic culture” in a way that 
recognizes “political community.” Feldman, supra note 45, at 60–61.  
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As seen both in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final passage and across the larger sweep 
of the opinion, this instruction in political morality delivers in at least two forms: one 
minimal, one maximal.213  
The minima of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s instruction in political morality are readily 
articulated: They’re the private party version of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final 
passage’s teaching on tolerance, defined with reference to those two thou-shalt-not’s, 
understood here not in terms of their precise, technical limits, which matter as 
authoritative, constitutional rules for courts, but rather as general mandates in a 
political morality of nonmalfeasance. The broad moral sensibilities that the thou-shalt-
not’s entail sound in themes of tolerance as a type of political respect. A Golden Rule, 
they speak to a political morality by which those who are struggling to protect and 
defend their ways of life against unwanted incursions by their political foes may 
commence a phase of political combat that operates not lawlessly but “in a respectful 
fashion that can work in our pluralist society.”214 Political enmity needn’t be dropped 
entirely, though it could be somewhat smoothed around its sharpest edges enough so 
that each side to the Kulturkampf recognizes that they and their opposing numbers are 
all members of a larger political community whose health, as a vessel that contains 
them and their politics and their political disputes, is a matter of general, including 
their own, political interest that must not be taken entirely for granted—like clean air. 
In this sense only, and as antithetical to a Schmittian notion of what politics is, these 
minima imply not just tolerance and respect but also friendship in a political sense.215 
As thinkable as these politics may be in those terms, they’re still likely to be greeted 
with, at best, ambivalence, including a deep aversion to them born of, among other 
things, the deep wounds and deep distrust that have been an enduring part of the 
Kulturkampf and that have even come to be baked into the identities of its warring 
camps. This makes the politics of friendship as a modification of the politics of 
enmity—or the politics of politics—acceptable only if the parties are prepared to 
relinquish the established constructions of who they, socially speaking, are.216 This 
 
213  This may or may not imply the operation of a spectrum. Given the practical resistance 
both these points are, by turns, likely and certain to face, the conceptualization of the middle 
may not matter all that much at just this point. 
214  Joshua Matz, Fury and despair over the Masterpiece Cakeshop ruling are misplaced, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/06/fury-
despair-masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-misplaced. Others have also seen a pluralist vision with 
aspirations for “peaceful coexistence between the LGBT and faith communities” at work in the 
case. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Common Ground Lawmaking: Lessons for Peaceful Coexistence 
from Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Utah Compromise, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019); id. at 
11–12 (noting that “Masterpiece Cakeshop’s signal contribution was its call for a new pluralism 
that ‘leaves space for everyone,’” and then providing some description of it). 
215  The locus classicus is SCHMITT, supra note 79. For examples of modern reflections on 
older themes of political or civic friendship that move in decidedly non-Schmittian directions, 
see DANIELLE S. ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 9–24, 101–59 (2004), and see also Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, On Civic 
Friendship, 107 ETHICS 97, 98–99 (1996) (commenting preliminarily that “political friendship” 
is “a necessary condition for genuine justice” and linking “civic friendship” to traditions of 
women’s lives involving reproduction). 
216  See the qualification in supra note 79. 
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isn’t impossible, naturally, but it isn’t nearly as easy as from outside of these 
perspectives it can sound. 
While the minima of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral-political homiletics appear 
and can practically be read off the surface of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s text, they travel 
in the decision with a set of maximal conditions that are discoverable deeper in the 
structure of the text: in the opinion’s active performance of them.217 Nobody should 
be surprised to hear at this point that Masterpiece Cakeshop is not a decision that, for 
its own part, shows only a bare minimum level of tolerance defined as non-
disparagement, non-disrespect, or non-indignity, toward the parties. The Court’s 
actual treatment of the parties’ ways of life is far more robust and generous than that. 
So, too, then, the maximal version of moral-political instruction that Masterpiece 
Cakeshop offers. 
Begin here by briefly returning to the pose that Masterpiece Cakeshop strikes 
toward the ways of life involved in the case. The Court’s stance toward these 
constitutionally countenanced, competing ways of life isn’t one of a detached, 
distanced, affectless rationality by which the Court mechanically and hierarchically 
goes about issuing rules that in their robotic way dispense legal justice. The Court’s 
stance toward the case and the lives the parties lead is marked by more thoughtful, 
affective investments. The Court elaborates its own thinking in the case by means that 
are both creative and sensitive. It generates, then seals, distinctive relationships with 
the parties and with others who share their ways of life. These relationships involve 
connection, identification, and, recall, even forms of psychological and literary merger 
with the parties in ways that give the Court the ability, however fleetingly, to be in 
another’s shoes walking his path, as part of its own process of giving voice both to 
arguments and the substantive rulings it issues.218 In other words, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop gets professionally and textually intimate with the parties in a way that far 
surpasses the “tolerance” its opinion formally and finally names.  
The way that Masterpiece Cakeshop exceeds the minima that it makes binding on 
other courts suggests the Court is aware of its own exertions and sees them as elements 
in a supererogatory performance. The Court may think it cannot realistically expect 
future courts to be as welcoming to such wildly divergent ways of life, or to be as fully 
engaged with them, as it itself is. This might be hubris or it might just be a frank 
recognition of the range of investments and sympathies that other courts may have in 
cases like this, which may duly limit their capacity or willingness to achieve 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s own model heights. Comparisons aside, the Court’s 
treatment of the parties in the case may help to explain why so many of its readers, 
who live the case’s opposing ways of life, experience it the way that they have and do: 
feeling seen, recognized, heard, understood, esteemed, known, and cared for, to the 
point of being held by the Court’s attentions and its ministrations, which ensure they 
 
217  The notion that the Court’s opinion’s performative dimensions are pedagogical is also 
found in Matz, supra note 214, which, Berg, supra note 9, at 160, quotes approvingly on this 
point. 
218  It is this that partly makes the Court’s command to lower courts to follow in its footsteps 
seem so problematic: Requiring this kind of relationship with the parties will assuredly be easier 
for some judges than for others, who may wish nothing so much as to resist it. 
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are constitutionally protected, safe, against what they themselves take to be, and what 
the Court appreciates as, harmful and discriminatory political predations. 
Figured this way, Masterpiece Cakeshop refuses to adopt, as Obergefell, Windsor, 
and Lawrence before it all did, the rhetorical posture of the fearsome figure of Lady 
Justice with her blindfold on, balancing her scales without being able to see who the 
parties are, her monumentally lethal sword, so dangerous, powerful, and ominous, in 
her other hand, a figure nightmares can be made of.219 Masterpiece Cakeshop prefers 
instead a different performance of masculinity, the rhetorical posture of which is that 
of the Father Judge who, needing no sword other than his wisdom, approaches and 
decides the case in ways that epitomize conviviality in political community and that, 
by example, encourages the parties to conduct themselves thus.220 So much does this 
Father Judge love the parties who have brought this dispute before him to resolve that, 
in his final remarks, as a fatherly judicial bequeath, he wills them to receive a modest 
version of the exemplary treatment he has given them.  
Suppressed, but still evident, is the subtle message that this disjunction implies. If 
the parties are to escape the constant warfare of Kulturkampf into freedom to live their 
respective ways of life the ways they wish, if they are to find the sort of full-bodied, 
loving fatherly treatment that the Father Court has showed them in this case, they must 
look not outward to courts but inward to themselves. Following the Court’s opinion’s 
lead, they can—and should—seek each other out the way that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
itself has. Recalling their equality to one another and their shared relation to the Father 
Court, the offering is in the form of a political morality of sibling, like paternal, love, 
the sole means of full release unto freedom from the political warfare that has become 
an element, hence part of the meaning and practice, of these ways of life.221 Tolerance 
and rules of forbearance aren’t nothing, are very important, certainly against a baseline 
of a limitless Hobbesian war of all against all. They are also limited, regularly, to being 
tickets to an eternal return to courts. In order to achieve another way of living, the 
parties to this dispute and ones like it will have to dig deeper and reach for more. This 
is seriously difficult work, but Masterpiece Cakeshop shows it can be done, and how, 
by providing an object lesson in the possibilities of growth that surpasses a formerly 
well-defined and well-bounded self, a self that has been steeped in a way of life and 
the certainties of the world that go along with it. Remember the line that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinions have repeatedly intoned in different ways about how “times can 
blind us to certain truths,” a sentiment Masterpiece Cakeshop echoes, too?
222
 Those 
who live the simultaneously loving and warring ways of life at odds in Masterpiece 
 
219  These rhetorical postures, including Lady Justice’s phantasmatic horrors, are sketched in 
Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, supra note 83, at 1094–1108. 
220  JEROME FRANK, Getting Rid of the Need for Father-Authority, in LAW AND THE MODERN 
MIND 243–52 (1930). 
221  Others have read this passage in similar ways as speaking about certain values of political 
pluralism and conviviality. Matz, supra note 214; Berg, supra note 9, at 156; Aaron M. Streett, 
Supreme Court Review: An Analysis of Masterpiece and Janus, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 311, 312 
(2018–2019) (“In Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy similarly sought to forge a national 
compromise in which the dignity of gay and lesbian persons is respected, while sincere religious 
beliefs are protected and not equated by the government to bigotry”). 
222 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
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Cakeshop may benefit from this teaching. If in other instances it has mostly been 
aimed to reveal how one can grow past homophobic versions of a self, the lesson, in 
principle, runs in any number of directions, and it involves a revelation of the 
importance of the moral-political value of fraternity as an aid in that process. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral politics of sibling love holds out the prospect—for 
those who wish to take it—of giving religious conservatives, traditional moralists, and 
lesbian and gay men and their allies, all, an opportunity to get their individual and 
collective sense of fraternity—and sorority—back. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s instruction in a moral politics of sibling love notably 
tracks highly traditional and romantic sensibilities about “the family” and what it is or 
should be.223 These sensibilities don’t originate in Masterpiece Cakeshop, though its 
expression of them broadly concords with ideals of marriage, family, family life, and 
familial love on display elsewhere in Justice Kennedy’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.224 Famously, this constellation of sensibilities has underwritten Justice 
Kennedy’s lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, nowhere more dramatically than in 
its right-to-marry decisions. Masterpiece Cakeshop brings this tradition forward into 
the present tense while charting a course for its operation in its own aftermath, after 
Justice Kennedy has left the Court. Scarcely inevitable, it might be thought to have 
been predictable enough, that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy’s romance 
 
223  The normativity of sibling love as a model for moral-political relations is challenged in 
part by work recognizing and engaging its dark sides, including its classically deeply gendered, 
horizontal, violent, and sexual dimensions, on which, see, for example the different 
permutations discussed in JULIET MITCHELL, SIBLINGS: SEX AND VIOLENCE 1–31, 111–29 (2003) 
(reflecting on aspects of the topic). On some of the problematics of the traditional political 
conception of fraternity, see, for example, CAROLE PATEMAN, The Fraternal Social Contract, in 
THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 33 (1989) 
(providing an account that “reveals that the social contract is a fraternal pact that constitutes 
civil society as a patriarchal or masculine order”), and CAROLE PATEMAN & CHARLES W. MILLS, 
CONTRACT AND DOMINATION 134–99 (2007) (discussing the social contract at the intersection 
of race and gender). Cf. generally Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope 
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family 
Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2005) (engaging the incest taboo for 
its role in and against the struggles for lesbian and gay equality, particularly same-sex marriage). 
224  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (“But marriage also confers 
more profound benefits. By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relationship, 
marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.’”) (citing United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)); id. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage, 
for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a 
marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the 
petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past 
death.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1996) (“The mother who 
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she 
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by 
woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love 
cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.”); see also, e.g., Gonzalez 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007) (“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret 
her choice to abort must suffer with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she 
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know[.]”). 
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with “family” would travel with a sense of how family life should work as a model for 
the Court, with all the Court’s children being equal and treated equally, if not exactly 
the same, in the distribution of goods that flow to them, precisely what Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s round-robins of equal treatment and their distributions of constitutional 
goods effectively achieves. All of the Father Court’s equally loved children share 
equally in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s constitutional bounty.225 Even if “gay persons,” as 
that asymmetry at the end of the opinion may be taken to reveal, are the opinion’s 
favorites. Favorites who, of course, lose on the central issue in the case, but who don’t 
really lose at all in the opinion’s wider scope, and who are set up for victory when the 
central issue returns to the Court. 
Now, to think of “the family” as the normative model for political relations and 
political community is very old school.226 Familiarity notwithstanding, the prospect 
that those whose ways of life have been adjudicated in Masterpiece Cakeshop will in 
any serious numbers find this classic view’s expression in the moral politics of sibling 
love acceptable—rather than a proper object of ridicule—beggars belief.227 This even 
though efforts that bathe the opinion’s love for family love in the cynical acid of 
critique run the risk of weakening the family-based, affective structures that are 
 
225  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1989) (“Parents know . . . children will accept quite readily all sorts of arbitrary substantive 
dispositions[.] . . . But try to let one brother or sister watch television when the others do not, 
and you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of justice unleashed.”). Naturally, this 
involves no suggestion of any substantive comparisons. Nor does it forget arguments from false 
equivalences as suggested, inter alia, by Sager & Tebbe, supra note 66, at 189–90. 
226  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594  (invoking Confucius, who “taught that marriage 
lies at the foundation of government”) (citing 2 LI CHI: BOOK OF RITES 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai 
eds., J. Legge trans., 1967)); see also, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND 
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 108 
(1834):  
Marriage is treated by all civilized nations as a peculiar and favored contract. It 
is in its origin a contract of natural law. It may exist between two individuals of 
different sexes, although no third person existed in the world, as happened in the 
case of the common ancestors of mankind. It is the parent, and not the child of 
society; principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicæ. 
227  Hence the potential for some of the moves elaborated in, inter alia, Mary Anne Case, Why 
“Live and Let Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious 
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, in INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND 
RELIGION: COMPETING SUPREMACIES 74–89 (Leora Batnitzky & Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017); 
Alan Jacobs, What a Clash Between Conservatives Reveals, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/conservative-christians-need-stay-
civil/590866; Sohrab Ahmari, Against David French-ism, FIRST THINGS (May 29, 2019), 
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/against-david-french-ism. See also 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. 18-547, 2018 WL 
5308156, at 4–5 (2018), cert. granted, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. 18-548, 2019 
WL 2493912 (2019) (“Because [The Kleins’] religion forbids complicity with sin, they could 
not design and create cakes to celebrate events that violate their religious beliefs.”). But see, 
e.g., Adam Serwer, The Illiberal Right Throws a Tantrum, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/ahmari-french-orban/591697/. 
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integral to the foundations of the decision as it is written. This is one practical reason 
why everyone who’s invested in the substantive outcomes that Masterpiece Cakeshop 
generates, but who is additionally unwilling to embrace a sibling politics of love, may 
practically be forced to countenance it and the general situation it produces: a situation 
in which the Supreme Court governs the nation not merely by means of constitutional 
mandate, nor by the light of reason’s objectivity, but in detectable measure by virtue 
of a judicial preference for an aesthetic form—romance—that is to be tolerated on 
pain of potentially losing access to the constitutional goods the case delivers. Walt 
Whitman may well have been right that “sermons never convince.”228 The power of 
the constitutional purse to purchase the silence of an unconvinced crowd, here, 
involving the thick morality that Masterpiece Cakeshop is preaching, should not be 
doubted.229 
C. The Moral Politics of Sibling Love: Reconfigured 
Let it be stipulated, then, that Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral politics of sibling 
love is doomed as a project that the parties to the Kulturkampf would willingly take 
up to regulate their own political dealings with one another.230 
Having noticed this political morality’s aesthetic investments, what if its 
commitment to romanticism were not imagined to inspire any form of political 
morality at all? What if, likewise, its aesthetic conditions were amplified in a way that 
would drain the moral politics of sibling love of its evangelizing, moralizing energies? 
Adverting to the prospect that Masterpiece Cakeshop itself raises, what if the moral 
politics of sibling love involved an extra-constitutional, extra-legal, extra-political, 
and non-morals-based project, say, a procedural protocol for encountering one’s 
political enemies at a distance from politics in an aesthetic sphere? (If you’ve got a 
thing against aesthetics as such, just imagine this is a non-legal, non-political, non-
morals-based plane of existence with room in it for reflection and repose.) Might the 
politics of sibling love then be emphatically rejected as a political morality and still 
countenanced, even favorably, as an aesthetic bid? Might the politics of sibling love 
operate aesthetically to hold up a mirror to the world and how those who live the ways 
of life implicated by Masterpiece Cakeshop look out onto others, both enemies and 
friends, and likewise themselves, in ways that might begin to capture the lived 
complexity of ideas and ideals of sibling love and their own, actual multi-faceted 
reactions to them? Might the moral politics of sibling love be valued for its way of 
 
228  WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 53 (Deathbed ed., 1891–92) 
(“Logic and sermons never convince, / The damp of the night drives deeper into my soul.”). 
229  What’s partly being bought here is what David Luban has called “legal instrumentalism.” 
See David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and 
Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279, 284 (1987). 
230  This is beyond the boundaries of what’s been recommended in, say, Koppelman, Gay 
Rights, Religious Accommodations, and Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 124, at 628 
(maintaining “[t]he gay rights movement has won[;] [i]t will not be stopped by a few 
exemptions[;] it should be magnanimous in victory”); or Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty 
and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2014) (noting some of the conflicts in “the 
culture wars” and suggesting some positions that each side might take). 
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conditioning encounters with beauty, including the beauty of worlds one does not 
normally see within one’s own way of life? 
An initial set of challenges of imagining an aesthetic encounter with the moral 
politics of sibling love involves how pervasively, particularly but not only of late, “the 
political” structures consciousness, experience, thought, and action. This is especially, 
but not only, true in legal circles. No less significant a difficulty is how deeply moral 
norms and sensibilities saturate U.S. modes of thought, making it a challenge, if not 
an insurmountable task, to think beyond these terms. What could it even mean to have 
an aesthetic encounter with the moral politics of sibling love? What could it mean to 
think of these relations without thinking about politics or morality? What might it 
mean to take up Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral-political teaching as a way to 
encounter the beauty, which is not the same thing as the political truth, that there can 
be in discovering how the world looks not through one’s own eyes as they are trained 
to see through the political and moral exigencies associated with one’s politics and 
one’s identity, but as they would differently look upon the world as from within the 
perhaps inside-outness of an enemy’s worldview? How might an encounter with such 
a different way of being-in-the-world and such a foreign manner of seeing-the-world 
feel? What would its sensations, intensities, contours, dark and bright, be like? What 
could its pleasures otherwise entail? What thoughts and feelings might it generate 
about the opportunities to live a beautiful life in step with the glory of God, with 
traditional morals, or with the ways that lesbians and gay men and their allies have 
sought to construct lives for themselves? What new admixtures, what new forms of 
life and its beauty might come into sight—or erupt into being—through these 
encounters?231 
Masterpiece Cakeshop itself supplies a convenient point of entry into these 
questions. While the case obviously involves a real, live legal dispute that features 
multiple, conflictual encounters between real, living persons complexly situated in 
relation to living, breathing institutional forms, all of which makes the opinion highly 
materialist, Masterpiece Cakeshop is, in the final analysis, also a text. Seen in those 
terms, it is unavoidably bound up with immaterial and literary representations: of the 
parties, what happened between and among them, their resulting injuries and 
institutional movements and adjudications of them, and the effects of the litigation and 
its resolutions on the represented parties and those others in society that they serve as 
stand-ins for. Read as a text, Masterpiece Cakeshop exceeds its functions as a site for 
the announcement of authoritative legal propositions or for recommending moral-
political ones. It is also itself precisely in its textual form a form of artifice, an aesthetic 
creation that readily lends itself as grist for aesthetic encounters, both with itself and 
with the ideas and characters that emerge within it, who are always, at most, partial 
representations, hence distortions, of their comprehensive material truths. 
Approached that way, imagine . . .  
What it might be like for the figures called Charlie Craig and David Mullins to 
encounter the figure named Jack Phillips and look out unto the world through his 
 
231  See, e.g., Bog Gallagher & Alexander Wilson, Michel Foucault: An Interview: Sex, Power 
and the Politics of Identity, ADVOCATE, Aug. 7, 1984, at 27 (quoting Michel Foucault discussing 
the possibilities of “new forms of relationships, new forms of love, new forms of creation,” and, 
generally, the “possibility of a creative life”). 
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mind’s eye. What might he see happening in his world: his business, his kitchen, his 
relationships, his faith, his artistry, his recipes and secrets, and the God and faith that 
inspire him? How did Phillips decide to refuse Craig and Mullins the custom wedding 
cake they wanted for their marriage celebration? It is said the decision served his God, 
hence was a practice of his faith and/or artistic faith, but how did the choice get made, 
and when? Did Phillips choose to refuse Craig and Mullins a custom wedding 
celebration cake before he ever encountered them? (Is “choice” even the right concept 
here?) Was it when Phillips first saw Craig and Mullins in person? When they asked 
him to make the cake for their shared celebration? Did Phillips see them when he 
looked at, and encountered, them? Were they recognizable to him as created in God’s 
image, like himself, his brothers? As men in love? Did they appear to him either 
initially or as their encounter unfolded, consistent with his religion, as sodomites, 
sinners, evil-doers, sinning or doing evil, or wanting to, while talking to him and 
telling him what they wanted him to do for them? Was conversation with them itself 
a sinful, erotic, maybe a dirty-feeling, experience? Is that why Phillips couldn’t 
imagine making them the custom cake they wanted without participating in their sinful 
reverie? How important was it for Phillips to stay away from them? Why was this 
distance so important? Was it all simply the principled affair reflected in the 
systematized and worked-out account provided to authorities in litigation? What else 
might it have been? 
What did the decision that Craig and Mullins made to bring an action against 
Phillips mean to him in terms of his ability to practice his religion, his artistic faith, or 
simply his artistry through his business in the public realm? Did the ultimately failed 
attempt to hold him legally to account itself asymmetrically seek to distribute 
opportunities to live the fullness of one’s personality—so that Craig and Mullins but 
not Phillips could fully be themselves in their sexual and religious and artistic 
identities, respectively, in the public realm? From Phillips’s point of view, does 
bringing the “hammer of government,” in the form of the state’s anti-discrimination 
law machinery, to bear on him for his service refusal decision limit his ability as a 
person of faith or an artist to live his life out and proud, as who he is?232 Are those 
modes of self-expression or expression to be limited to non-public realms, like homes 
or houses of worship? If so, does anti-discrimination law in its exemplary forms 
actually reflect rule-of-law values of generality and neutrality? Appearances to the 
contrary notwithstanding, do anti-discrimination laws violate liberal tenets of state 
neutrality between competing conceptions of the good life, favoring some, disfavoring 
 
232  The “hammer of government” language is George Will’s. Fox News Sunday with Chris 
Wallace (Fox News Network television broadcast Mar. 2, 2014) (available at 
https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20140302_230000_FOX_News_Sunday_With_Chri
s_Wallace/start/3060/end/3120) (“It’s a funny kind of sore winner in the gay rights movement 
that would say a photographer doesn’t want to photograph my wedding. I have got lots of other 
photographers I could go to. But I’m going to use the hammer of government to force them to 
do this. It’s not neighborly and it’s not nice. The gay rights movement is winning. But they 
should be, as I say, not sore winners.”). Similar thinking is in Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement 
Is Not Always Discrimination: On Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial 
Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 124 (2018) (describing Colorado’s anti-
discrimination statute as “part of a larger national trend in which authorities are using 
antidiscrimination statutes as swords to punish already marginalized people (such as supporters 
of the conjugal understanding of marriage), rather than as shields to protect people from unjust 
discrimination (such as African Americans in the wake of Jim Crow and today).”). 
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others, hence contemplating, if not constituting, a practice of discrimination against 
people of faith in itself? 
From Phillips’s perspective, what might the organized forces of political power 
look like in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s reaffirmation of Obergefell, a decision 
that reflects a politically liberal regime that may be extended by Colorado’s anti-
discrimination rules? Might Phillips think of himself as a minority and an outsider in 
the community he shared with Craig and Mullins? Is it because of his faith, his artistic 
faith, or both? Were Craig and Mullins the majoritarian, hence socially dominant, 
forces in the case, backed with state power, when they sought to make him make them 
a custom wedding celebration cake against his wishes not to be involved with them, 
their relationship, and their “marriage”? Against these arrangements of power, was 
Phillips’s refusal of service a defensive or an offensive act? Was it more about 
preserving his own self-understanding and his religious and artistic commitments than 
transgressing against Craig and Mullins’s selfhood as capacitated by the political 
community at large and also by the state? From Phillips’s point of view, did Craig and 
Mullins see him in the fullness of his personality as they sought to exercise the state-
backed power that they had over him? In seeking to override his faithful and artistic 
refusal, did they discriminate against him because of his faith or artistry or otherwise 
violate his religiously grounded autonomy? 
Sticking with this perspective just a bit longer, as Jack Phillips saw it, what were 
the meanings of the attitudes and expressions, along with the silences, of state actors 
as his “case” was processed by governmental institutions? Did they reveal exceptional 
sensibilities that could, as Masterpiece Cakeshop suggested, be corrected, or are they 
in fact the ordinary sensibilities of the logic of politically liberal, including pro-LGBT, 
legal regimes? Do they invariably function to make Phillips and others like him a 
pariah? Do politically liberal equality politics operative in Colorado (and elsewhere) 
risk making cultural conservatives and traditional moralists the outlaws that lesbians 
and gay men once, not too long ago, were, and still are in certain communities? Is 
what happened here also bad for artists generally or only artists of faith? What do these 
deployments of power reveal, if anything, about the complex meanings of the equality 
and freedom, hence the justice, that the lesbian and gay movements have been fighting 
for? If those principles guarantee Craig and Mullins a right to public life and equal 
service, what does it mean for them to exercise and enforce that right against Jack 
Phillips? 
Turning the tables around, what might it be like for the figure of Jack Phillips to 
imagine what transpired between him and the figures of Charlie Craig and David 
Mullins through their fictive minds’ eyes? Who were these men? What were their lives 
like—separately then together—before they encountered Phillips? How did they know 
and experience and suffer the conditions of homosexuality’s political and legal 
outlawry in the time before Obergefell, when they were practically required to leave 
the state to have their love and commitment to one another sanctified by law as the 
union of man and man as spouses? How have they experienced homosexuality’s 
political and legal outlawry since Masterpiece Cakeshop? What did their political and 
legal exclusions from marriage and the complex histories of homophobia to which 
they were related do to shape Craig and Mullins and their lives? How might it have 
informed their encounters with religious conservatives and traditional moralists who 
viewed them, their intimacies, and their relationships as sinful, evil, wicked, hell-
bound, or the corruption of the community, and thus would have—as law in Colorado 
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once did—happily cast them out of political community altogether? How, to them, 
might Phillips have represented, and even historically in a general sense been, a source 
of their suffering—long before they entered Masterpiece Cakeshop? How safe did 
they feel being themselves in public and in Phillips’s bakery? What effects on them 
did Phillips’s refusal have? What embarrassment, humiliation, pain, trauma, did it 
involve—or reopen? What injustice did they understand the refusal of service to 
involve? Who else, as word of Phillips’s refusal spread, may Craig and Mullins have 
understood to have been harmed by Phillips’s actions? How might they have taken 
Phillips’s refusal as a tear in the politically liberal social fabric Obergefell represents 
and which they esteem, and maybe experience as a condition of their own security? 
How much did they see lodging an official complaint against Phillips as an attempt to 
redress their own injuries and the injuries to the community that Phillips’s actions 
involved? How much was it about protecting others from suffering what they did? 
Was the action a cri de cœur by which they insisted they wouldn’t shrink into the sorts 
of debased, shamed selves they may have understood Phillips’s refusal as seeking to 
enforce? Did they care about the source of Phillips’s discriminatory refusal or were 
they indifferent to it? 
From the perspective of the figures of Craig and Mullins, what might the organized 
forces of political power to which Phillips willingly allied himself look like both in 
the run-up to and in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop 
decision? When significant elements in a large-scale and complex social movement 
of cultural conservatives and traditional moralists from across the country and with 
local roots in Colorado and every state in the union rallied to Phillips’s cause, joined 
no less by the institutional authority of the federal government in the form of the U.S. 
Solicitor General, how weak, how marginal, how dispossessed, how powerless, how 
unable to inflict real political harm, including subordination on Craig and Mullins, 
might he have looked to Craig and Mullins then? How much was the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision a reminder of the insubstantiality and precarity of rules of law holding 
that what Phillips did was discrimination that should be and was outlawed? How much 
did Masterpiece Cakeshop remind Craig and Mullins that their legal rights under state 
law are readily displaced by the authoritative force of a worldview that, seemingly out 
of nowhere, decides that Phillips, despite his discriminatory refusal of service, was the 
real victim at the state’s hands in the case? So victimized, in fact, that the state was 
given no opportunity for a do-over in order to vindicate Craig and Mullins’s legal 
rights? Considering all this, how is power nationally being arranged when state 
administrative and judicial processes are this easily overturned in Phillips’s favor? 
What does it mean when the injury that the figures of Craig and Mullins experienced, 
recognized by state law and state actors, and consistent with the state’s obligations to 
ensure equal treatment of lesbians and gay men, is legally for naught in relation to the 
central holding of Masterpiece Cakeshop?233 
 
233  Compare Laycock, Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 2 at 193 
(venturing that the “problems of hostility to the LGBT community” that remain “are very far 
from systemic” and “are not remotely comparable to the plight of African-Americans” of the 
mid-twentieth century, and then observing that the “[r]efusal to protect religious liberty cannot 
be justified by the absurd claim that conservative Christians today systematically suppress gays 
and lesbians in the way that southern whites systematically suppressed African-Americans 
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These are, of course, highly stylized representations of the radically discontinuous 
and fundamentally oppositional perspectives framed by worldviews operative in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Viewed aesthetically, they need not be abandoned, 
compromised, or reconciled. Aesthetically, these representations may just be what 
they are or as they seem as one considers them, moving one’s own mind’s eye across 
the representational terrain. As one does, it is possible, but not necessary, that one’s 
enemy and one’s enemy’s world, hence oneself and one’s own, may begin emerging 
in a new and different light. On the aesthetic plane, unlike the political, experientially, 
nothing needs to be decided or acted upon in relation to these perspectival shifts. Non-
decisionism and inaction may be the rule here, the rule of beauty, of the encounter, of 
its sensations, nothing more.  
To be sure, none of this is the point Masterpiece Cakeshop seeks to make. It is not 
the point of either the minima or the maxima of its moral-political instruction. 
Be that as it may, taken strictly on its own terms, there’s something deeply ironic, 
if also tragic, about the Court’s moral-political homiletics, particularly its moral 
politics of sibling love. The irony is in the way this attempt to forge new political 
moralities emerges in an opinion authored by a Supreme Court Justice whose 
benchwork, particularly but not only in the context of lesbian and gay rights, was, 
throughout his career on the Bench, willing to extract so many hotly contested issues 
from the field of politics, deciding for the people who have been politically engaged, 
in the name of the Constitution, the nation, and the people themselves. As James 
Bradley Thayer noted over a century ago, robust practices of judicial review like this 
are notable for their tendency to sap the people themselves of their capacities for 
managing their own political relations, conflicts, and contests.234 It is thus tragic in the 
sense that this opinion, which arrives at the endpoint of a career-defining 
jurisprudence, seeks to return to the people and their politics something that it 
recognizes they have seemingly lost. Now, at the end of his judicial career, Justice 
Kennedy, who did what he did on the Court to rule the nation, produces a text that’s 
actively searching for ways to express the view in moral-political terms that one of the 
hopes for the country he unquestionably loves is to be found, after all, in how the 
people relate to one another and govern themselves. It is fitting that the opinion’s 
moral-political teaching, both its instruction in a moral politics of respect and 
fraternity, but more especially its instruction in a moral politics of sibling love, arrives 
not with a bang that announces itself, but with a whimper that must be carefully 
attended to in order to discover its meaning. This whimper, not coincidentally, also 
 
through the mid-twentieth century”), with Sager & Tebbe, supra note 66, at 187–88 (describing 
lesbians and gay men as “long . . . the victims of structural injustice—or patterns of ‘disrespect 
and subordinat[ion],’ to use Justice Kennedy’s language in Obergefell—that are enduring, 
pervasive, and tentacular.”). To challenge the structuralism or the systematicity of anti-lesbian 
and anti-gay discrimination in the present tense is at least in part to weaken the foundations on 
which Obergefell, decided practically yesterday, rests. 
234  See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893). 
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expresses the dim likelihood of this instruction’s success, virtually nil for the maximal 
political morality of family, fraternity, sorority, and love. 
Whether the partisans involved in Masterpiece Cakeshop choose on any level—
political, aesthetic, or otherwise—to hear and heed the call for sibling love that the 
opinion issues is, again, beyond anything officially in the Court’s power to 
command.235 This opinion, which does what it practically can to secure Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudential legacy at the level of constitutional doctrine, promising to 
continue the era he helped inaugurate of constitutional equal dignity, respect, and full 
citizenship status for lesbians and gay men, has, as many landmark principles do, met 
the practical limits of the power of judicial review and decision. While Justice 
Kennedy may well have changed the course of lesbian and gay rights, hastening their 
realization through Supreme Court opinions that altered our country’s history, and 
perhaps by extension, the world’s, his position of high office left him and the other 
Members of the Supreme Court utterly powerless to bring Messrs. Jack Phillips and 
Charlie Craig and David Mullins—real, living persons, and not just figures in the 
text—together in political friendship or in family, fraternity, and love, in a political 
space of mutual understanding in which they might will to work together, lovingly, 
toward a shared future of equal concern and respect for all that is of their own 
collective making. Not even a swing Justice on the highest court in the most powerful 
land on the face of the planet Earth can make of these neighbors, these enemies, 
friends, much less brothers, nor teach them, finally, how to meet one another as though 
in political family in their rich, complex, same and different, authentic fullnesses. The 
source of that grace, or that outrage, whatever it is and wherever it is to be found, 
comes from someplace else. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In this respect anyway, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Masterpiece Cakeshop 
Court is a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling. As a sign, Masterpiece Cakeshop both 
is and is not. 
 
 
235  Charles L. Black, Jr.’s thinking is apt here:  
I think the concept of citizenship might be a useful corrective to another concept—
that of “brotherhood”—which played so prominent a part a few years ago in the 
utterances of the opponents of racism. I have to say that it seems to me that this 
word embodied a concept deeply wrong. It suggested that the public demand was 
that some men had a duty to feel toward and to treat other men as brothers. This, I 
submit, is an overreaching, a basic defect in theory, a radically wrong symbolism. 
That demand never can be made as of right; to make it invites disappointment, and 
may easily tend to frighten and repel those on whom the demand is made. Brotherly 
love may stand somewhere in the shadow of time, waiting. There is not very much 
that law can do about that. But fellow-citizenship is for now, for the day before 
yesterday. The robust clarity, the received authority of right law, could make no 
greater symbolic contribution to the theory of our race relations than by using this 
concept as its chief building material. 
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60 (1969). 
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